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Reassessing the Dialogic Possibilities of
Weak-Form Bills of Rights
By CHRISTINE BATEUP*
I. Introduction
Since the end of World War II in 1945, an "astonishing growth of
constitutionalism" has taken place around the world. Stemming in
large part from a commitment to safeguard minorities from the
potential tyranny of majority rule, constitutional design since that
time has centered on the widespread adoption of charters of
fundamental rights and the empowerment of judges to interpret these
rights and provide remedies where they have been infringed.2
Although there are significant variations in the form that judicial
review takes in different nations, the vast majority of systems have
followed the American approach of granting judges the unreviewable
power to set aside legislation that conflicts with protected rights.
In more recent years, a number of Commonwealth nations have
begun to experiment with alternative models of rights protection.
Concerned that granting the judiciary the unreviewable power to
nullify legislation subverts democratic ideals of government,3 these
countries have adopted bills of rights that seek to ensure that courts
* J.S.D., NYU School of Law; Associate, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP. I
would like to thank John Ferejohn, Barry Friedman, Janet Hiebert, Kent Roach and
Cheryl Saunders for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 707 (2001).
2. See, e.g., id.; Wojciech Sadurski, Rights-Based Constitutional Review in
Central and Eastern Europe, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Tom
Campbell et al. eds., 2001).
3. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (1962) (describing judicial review as a
"deviant institution in American democracy" because of its countermajoritarian
tendencies); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 211-31 (1999) (suggesting
that judicial review under a bill of rights inevitably results in harm to the principle of
democratic participation).
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can play a role in the protection of rights without rejecting the
importance of the legislative perspective. 4  "Weak-form" bills of
rights accomplish this by adopting innovative power-distributing
mechanisms that grant judges a central role in the interpretation and
application of fundamental rights, while at the same time empowering
the legislature to have the final word.'
Weak-form bills of rights have generated much excitement in
contemporary constitutional scholarship because they are believed to
create a "third model of constitutionalism that stands between the
two polar models of constitutional and legislative supremacy,"
thereby "decoupl[ing] judicial review from judicial supremacy."6
They are also frequently praised for creating the framework for
"dialogue" between courts and legislatures regarding the
determination of questions of fundamental rights.7 Precisely because
judges do not have the final word, dialogue theorists argue that weak-
form bills of rights create the potential for a collaborative and
continuing conversation between the branches about the optimal way
to protect and enforce rights that "promises to add new dimension
and perspective to the task of constitutional interpretation and to
enrichen the enterprise. ' The process of sharing the interpretation
of rights through inter-branch dialogue is also thought to reconcile
the tension that exists between judicial review and democracy,
because although judges can make an important contribution with
respect to fundamental rights, this "rarely raises an absolute barrier
to the wishes of democratic institutions."9
4. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What
Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 665 (2003) (describing the new
model as one that "accept[s] the truth of the argument for empowering courts to
protect human rights without denying the truth of the argument for democracy").
5. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-
and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 814 (2003) (coining
the term "weak-form judicial review").
6. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 709.
7. See infra Part II.
8. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 747.
9. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts
and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All),
35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 81 (1997); see also KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT
ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 226 (2001) [hereinafter
ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL] ("Democracy is maintained and even enhanced
by the ability of legislatures to limit or even override rights as declared by courts.").
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Although weak-form dialogue theorists claim that these new bills
of rights create the structural potential for inter-branch dialogue, they
also argue that judges and legislators must engage in a genuine and
open conversation, learn from the other's unique institutional
perspective and, where appropriate, modify their own positions
accordingly if the dialogic potential of weak-form instruments is to be
realized in practice.' ° Weak-form dialogue theory is thus a heavily
prescriptive theory of judicial review that conceives of dialogue
between the branches predominantly as a matter of principled
institutional choice. What remains uncertain, however, is whether
judges and legislators are likely to adopt a normative posture of
dialogue when performing their roles under weak-form bills of rights.
The twin goals of this Article are to determine whether the
normative behavioral assumptions of weak-form dialogue theory are
realistic and, if not, to consider what this means for the future
significance of "dialogue" as an explanatory concept under weak-
form bills of rights. In pursuing the first goal, the Article applies the
insights of positive theory to consider the nature of the interactions
between judges and legislators that we can actually expect under
weak-form instruments. Positive theory holds great potential to help
us understand this question because in contrast to normative or
prescriptive constitutional theory, which centers on how judges
should behave and the attitude they should take to the work of other
institutions," positive scholars are more interested in the alternate
question of how judges in fact behave when they decide cases.12 In
order to answer this question, positive theorists focus on the
motivations and incentives that drive judicial - and legislative - behavior
and the various forces that impact on institutional decision-making.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001) (setting out standards for judicial review so that the judiciary can
appropriately contribute to American democracy); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that judges should
exercise their judicial review powers only when this identifies and corrects
malfunctions in the political process).
12. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political
(Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS L. U. J. 783, 789 (2003) (explaining that
political science scholarship focuses on the "non-normative" "question of why judges
reach the decisions that they do"); Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule
of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89, 90 (2005) (observing that political scientists
study "political actions, including Supreme Court decision making, through the
rigorous application of social science techniques.").
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One of the most influential strands of positive theory focuses on
judicial decision-making in the separation of powers context.'3 This
account centers on the recognition that the three branches stand in a
system of separated powers in which each branch - including the
judiciary - has a variety of ways in which it can constrain the others
and impede the realization of their preferences. Faced with this
potential implementation problem, each branch can be expected to
act strategically and to adjust its behavior in anticipation of how the
others might respond. For the judiciary, this means that judges
necessarily consider whether the political branches are willing and
able to use their available tools of constraint to overcome judicial
rulings. If there are significant structural or strategic impediments to
effective political action in a particular constitutional system, judges
will have a greater degree of freedom to pursue their own preferences
in particular cases without fear of a political response.
Drawing on these positive insights about the "mutual strategic
interplay" between judges and legislators, this Article makes a
number of original claims about the institutional behavior that can be
expected under weak-form bills of rights.'4 Of primary importance, it
suggests that the judiciary and the legislature can be expected to
behave strategically regardless of the form that a particular national
bill of rights takes. To the extent that there are discernable
differences between systems in relation to how the judiciary and the
legislature interact, this behavior is more likely to be driven by the
existence of structural and/or strategic impediments to effective
political action in a specific constitutional system, rather than by any
normative desire that judges and legislators may have to engage in
inter-branch dialogue.
Despite the fatal blow that these positive claims strike to the
behavioral assumptions of weak-form dialogue theory, this Article
does not argue that the concept of dialogue should be completely
discarded. In fact, a closer examination of positive insights reveals
that weak-form theorists have simply been looking for dialogue in the
wrong place. This Article instead claims that all systems of judicial
review, both strong-form and weak-form, can be expected to generate
similar forms of society-wide dialogue between the judiciary, the
political branches and the people about the meaning and
13. See infra Part III.A.




interpretation of rights, stemming from the system of constraints on
judicial behavior. Dialogue is thus best understood as a general and
wide-ranging feature of the strategic relationship between the
judiciary and other actors, rather than a more limited form of
institutional interaction that is created by the adoption of specific
weak-form bill of rights mechanisms.
The Article takes the following form. Part II introduces the two
leading weak-form bill of rights models that have been adopted in
Canada and the United Kingdom. It also considers the weak-form
dialogue literature that has arisen surrounding these instruments and
the claims that this literature makes regarding the ways that judges
and legislators should behave in order to achieve desirable inter-
branch interactions. Part III turns to positive theory and utilizes its
insights about strong-form systems to examine the forms of behavior
we can expect of the judiciary and the legislature under each of the
leading weak-form models of judicial review. In order to test these
behavioral claims, Part IV then takes a closer look at the experience
of Canada and the United Kingdom with their respective charters of
rights and how the judiciary and the legislature have actually
performed their roles under those instruments. This examination
reveals that although Canadian and British judges and legislators
have not regularly engaged in the kinds of interactions advocated by
weak-form dialogue theorists, they have behaved consistently with
the expectations of positive theory.
Having highlighted the fundamental problems with the
behavioral assumptions of weak-form dialogue theory, Part V
explains why dialogue nonetheless remains a useful concept provided
we understand it in a different way to weak-form theorists. In this
vein, Part V proposes the alternate reformulation of dialogue as a
society-wide practice. Although this form of dialogue can be
expected to occur in the great majority of systems in which judges are
granted the power to review legislation for compatibility with
protected rights, this Part concludes by considering which models of
judicial review are likely to promote the most successful operation of
society-wide dialogue.
20091
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H. Weak-form Bills of Rights and the
Evolution of Dialogue Theory
The unifying feature of the weak-form model of judicial review is
that it seeks to balance the judicial protection of rights with a greater
role for legislative judgment. There are, nonetheless, critical
differences in the power-distributing mechanisms that weak-form bills
of rights incorporate to achieve this balance. The two principal
approaches are represented by the bills of rights that have been
adopted in Canada and the United Kingdom. 5 Under the Canadian
legislative override model, judges are granted the power to strike
down legislation that conflicts with protected rights, while legislatures
retain the decisive ability to override judicial invalidations in the
event of disagreement. The British declaration of incompatibility
model, in contrast, restricts judges to issuing non-binding declarations
that challenged legislation is incompatible with protected rights. It is
then a matter for Parliament to decide whether the statute in question
should be amended in light of the court's ruling.
This Part briefly introduces the Canadian and British models of
rights-based judicial review and discusses how theories of inter-
branch dialogue have emerged as leading ways of conceiving the
relationship between judges and legislators in these weak-form
systems. It also explores whether dialogue theory, as presently
conceived in Canada and the United Kingdom, provides a satisfying
explanation of judicial and legislative behavior under these weak-
form models.
A. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms -
The Legislative Override Model
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter") is
widely considered to be the pioneer of the new weak-form approach
to judicial review.16 Prior to the enactment of the Charter in 1982, as
15. A slightly different variation of the weak-form model exists under the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act. See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z.
No. 109 (N.Z.). Given that the New Zealand model has been widely criticized for its
ineffective protection of rights and has proved to be unpopular in bills of rights
debates in other nations, this Article restricts its focus to the two leading weak-form
models. See also infra notes 40, 55, discussing the weak-form bills of rights that have
been adopted in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, Australia.
16. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,




part of the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution from the United
Kingdom,'7 Canada's federal and provincial legislatures exercised the
power of parliamentary supremacy. Although courts played a role in
interpreting Canada's existing constitution, this did not extend to
reconciling parliamentary supremacy with fundamental rights; judicial
power was instead limited to consideration of questions concerning
the division of powers between federal and provincial legislatures.
The enactment of the Charter fundamentally altered the
constitutional role of the judiciary in Canada. Similar to the
constitutional protection of rights in the American setting, the
Charter grants judges full powers of judicial review to enforce
protected rights.' In contrast to the United States, however, the
Charter also grants Canadian legislatures the formal power to
overcome judicial invalidations on Charter grounds pursuant to the
legislative override, or "notwithstanding" clause, contained in section
33. According to this provision, the federal Parliament or the
legislature of a province may "expressly declare" by a simple majority
that a law "shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in
section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of [the] Charter."' 9 These sections
include the "fundamental freedoms" such as the freedoms of religion
and expression, due process and equality rights, but not democratic
rights, mobility rights, language rights or education rights. In the
event of judicial invalidation, Canadian legislatures can accordingly
re-enact the offending legislation with a "notwithstanding" clause to
ensure its continued validity.' Declarations made under section 33
have effect for a maximum period of five years, but they can be
renewed by the legislature upon their expiration.' While such a
declaration is in force, further judicial review of the relevant
17. The repatriation of the Canadian Constitution was technically achieved by
the passage of the Canada Act in the United Kingdom. See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CANADA AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1979-1982:
PATRIATION AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS (1982); Howard Leeson, Section 33, The
Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?, CHOICES, June 2000, at 7-13.
18. Canadian Charter, § 52.
19. Canadian Charter, § 33(1).
20. While the legislative history to the passage of section 33 suggests it was
intended to be used only subsequent to a judicial decision, it has been used
preemptively on a number of occasions. Given that such preemptive uses have been
widely criticized and have never been characterized as a dialogic feature of the
Charter, this Article focuses solely on use of the override power following judicial
invalidation of legislation.
21. Canadian Charter, § 33(3) - (4).
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legislation is excluded.
The section 33 override was proposed during governmental
negotiations about the Charter as a way to assuage provincial
concerns that the Charter would abandon the foundational principle
of parliamentary supremacy and surrender provincial powers to the
federal government under a scheme of nationalized rights.2
Although the provision was thus introduced as a tool for preserving
regional differences, over time the democracy-enhancing potential of
the override has become the primary focus of constitutional theorists.
Following the passage of the Charter, many commentators came to
champion the legislative override for the imaginative way it
empowers courts to protect human rights, while at the same time
preserving the ability of the legislature to have the final say about
their meaning and interpretation.2 3 At long last, it seemed, a
structural device had been formulated that could balance
parliamentary and judicial supremacy, resulting in a more
democratically sound system of judicial review. 4
The unique way in which the legislative override promised to
reconcile the judicial protection of fundamental rights with
democratic concerns soon led Canadian theorists to suggest that the
provision promotes an interactive and democratic dialogue between
courts and legislatures. The most prominent early proponent of the
dialogue approach was Paul Weiler, who was also one of the principal
architects of section 33.25 According to Weiler, although judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislation is a vital part of a
democratic system of government, this practice should not be
determinative because judges can sometimes make mistakes. A
legislative override power is thought to balance these concerns by
22. See Janet L. Hiebert, Compromise and the Notwithstanding Clause: Why the
Dominant Narrative Distorts our Understanding (2007) (unpublished manuscript);
Leeson, supra note 17, at 308-12; Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy:
A New Canadian Version, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 64-65 (1984) [hereinafter
Weiler, Rights and Judges].
23. See, e.g., Brian Slattery, A Theory of the Charter, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 701
(1987); Peter H. Russell, Standing Up for Notwithstanding, 29 ALTA. L. REV. 293
(1991); Weiler, Rights and Judges, supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 292 ("The
Charter has created a fertile and democratic middle ground between the extremes of
legislative and judicial supremacy.").
25. See Weiler, Rights and Judges, supra note 22; Paul Weiler, Of Judges and




creating a dialogue about constitutional meaning in which courts can
perform their valuable judicial review role and deliberate on
questions of principle, but which reserves an "escape valve" or "final
say" for the legislature "to be used sparingly in the exceptional case
where the judiciary has gone awry."26
In subsequent years, Canadian theorists have developed more
sophisticated accounts of the dialogic potential of the section 33
override. In particular, while Weiler conceived of the override
principally as a tool for the legislature to correct judicial errors,
subsequent work has expanded on the roles that both courts and
legislatures should play in dialogue with one another in a legislative
override system. In some accounts, it is suggested that courts should
make important contributions on questions of principle, while
legislatures can add an important perspective to constitutional
debates about rights in relation to the articulation of policy.2 In other
theories, both courts and legislatures are regarded as institutions
capable of making principled decisions, but are thought to bring more
distinct institutional contributions to Charter conflicts based on their
distinctive constitutional roles and the fact that they are differently
situated in relation to Charter conflicts.29 Regardless of the precise
roles that are prescribed for the branches, however, these theories all
suggest that the override enables courts and legislatures to engage in
an interactive partnership in which each branch can bring its unique
perspective to bear on the meaning and interpretation of rights,
ultimately leading to better answers. °
26. Weiler, Rights and Judges, supra note 22, at 84, 79.
27. For a discussion of the normative value of the judicial and legislative roles
proposed in different theories of dialogue, see generally Christine Bateup, The
Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional
Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1123-74 (2006) [hereinafter Bateup, The Dialogic
Promise].
28. See, e.g., ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 286 (suggesting
that in inter-branch dialogue, courts are best suited "to bring to the table the
importance of fundamental values", while legislatures are best at "bringling]
knowledge of regulatory objectives and obstacles that the court may otherwise have
difficulty appreciating.").
29. See Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS:
INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 231, 239 (Tom Campbell et. al. eds., 2003)
(suggesting that the branches can "bring to their respective judgments different
perspectives that reflect their distinctive roles and the fact that they are differently
situated, relative to the Charter conflict.").
30. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER
191 (2d ed., 2001) (suggesting that the section 33 override can "encourage a more
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In order for this interactive inter-branch partnership to be
practically achieved, weak-form dialogue theorists counsel the
judiciary and the legislature to behave in a dialogically appropriate
fashion in their interactions with one another. On the one hand,
weak-form dialogue theorists suggest that the judiciary should show
respect for the legislature by listening to its justifications for
legislative measures before deciding to strike down a law. Judges
should, nonetheless, be prepared to act on the basis of their sincere
institutional views and nullify legislation if they form the view that the
legislature has not acted in a way that shows sufficient respect for
fundamental rights. The legislature, in turn, should carefully consider
what the court has said in its ruling and attempt to "address its merits
and engage in a principled discussion" before deciding whether to use
the override.3 If the legislature decides that its original legislation
was justified, despite judicial concerns, then it should give effect to its
sincere views by invoking the section 33 override power.32 According
to weak-form dialogue theorists, although the override provision
creates the framework for inter-branch dialogue, whether dialogue is
actually achieved as a practical matter accordingly depends heavily on
the normative behavioral choices of the different branches.
Actual experience with the override has cast significant doubts
on whether courts and legislatures can or do behave in the way that
weak-form dialogue theorists prescribe. Despite scholarly praise for
the override, the provision has been rarely utilized by Canadian
legislatures to respond to judicial rulings about Charter rights.33 In
fact, the override has been used only twice by provincial legislatures
to respond to judicial rulings, and actively contemplated in only a
politically vital discourse on the meaning of rights and their relationship to competing
constitutional visions than what emanates from the judicial monologue that exists in a
regime of judicial supremacy."); Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding
Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221, 263 (2002) (proposing a dialogic model of
"deliberative disagreement" in which courts and legislatures can engage in
"constructive deliberation" with each other).
31. Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, supra note 30, at 264.
32. See, e.g., Slattery, supra note 23 (suggesting that section 33 promotes a
"continuing dialogue" between courts and legislatures which rests less on each
branch policing the other than on their individual assessments of their own actions in
light of Charter values).
33. See Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion:
Lessons from the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN,
255 (2001) [hereinafter Kahana, Public Discussion] (examining the various uses of
the override); Tsvi Kahana, Legalism, Anxiety and Legislative Constitutionalism, 31
QUEEN'S L.J. 536, 555 n.51 (2006) (updating his previous work).
[Vol. 32:2
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handful of other cases.3 Even more strikingly, the federal Parliament
has never used the override, nor seriously considered doing so.
The reason why the override has been used so infrequently in
Canada is generally attributed to historical circumstance, specifically
Quebec's audacious uses of the mechanism in the early years of the
Charter's operation. Quebec first used the override just nine weeks
after the Charter came into effect, when the province passed a law
that invoked the provision in a blanket fashion with respect to all
existing Quebec legislation." The provincial government took these
steps to express its anger that the Charter had been adopted over
Quebec's objections and as a way of opting out of the document to
the greatest extent possible.
Quebec's early use of the override power created significant
controversy in Canada. A much greater political storm was to follow
in 1988, however, when that province again used the override power
in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Ford v. Quebec.36 In that
case, the Supreme Court invalidated a Quebec law that required
public signs and commercial advertising to be in the French language
only. Given that an override clause was already included in the
legislation, the Court struck down the law on non-Charter grounds.
That override was, however, due to expire very soon after the ruling
and the Court stressed that once this occurred, the law would abridge
the freedom of expression guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter.
Within a week of this decision, the Quebec legislature passed a new
statute that invoked section 33 and reauthorized Quebec's ban on
English in commercial signs. Quebec's francophone majority
applauded this result, but the reaction in other quarters was almost
universally negative. In particular, Quebec's English speaking
minority and the population of the rest of Canada were highly critical
of the legislation because it was thought to be an attempt to
subordinate the minority rights of English speakers in Quebec to the
majority French speakers.
In combination with Quebec's earlier blanket use of the override,
the province's actions following Ford are widely regarded as having
created a "political climate of resistance" to the override's use.37 This
34. See generally Kahana, Public Discussion, supra note 33.
35. All existing legislation was repealed and reenacted with a notwithstanding
provision. See An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, SQ 1982, c.21.
36. Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.).
37. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 9, at 83.
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explanation suggests that the lack of use of section 33 is merely an
"historical accident" that may not be replicated if similar provisions
were adopted in other nations. If this is true, then it would remain
theoretically possible for the judicial and legislative branches in other
nations to choose to engage in genuine and productive dialogue with
one another using a similar tool.39 This assumes, however, that judges
and legislators would be both willing and able to act in the sincere
and collaborative fashion that Canadian dialogue theorists propose if
a legislative override were available.
It is impossible to provide a definitive answer about the validity
of these normative behavioral assumptions given that Canada is
presently the only country to have adopted the legislative override
model.' Subsequent developments in Canadian dialogue theory and
anecdotal evidence about judicial and legislative behavior in Canada
nonetheless appear to cast significant doubt on whether these
assumptions are realistic. In this regard, although section 33 remains
the most unique feature of the Charter - and the single element that
originally led scholars to proclaim that the Charter created a third
model of dialogic constitutionalism - its desuetude has prompted
Canadian dialogue theorists to suggest that other, less distinctive,
features of the Charter also have significant dialogue-promoting
capacities. In particular, theorists now place much greater emphasis
on section 1 of the Charter for promoting vibrant dialogue between
the judiciary and the legislature in Canada.41
38. MANFREDI, supra note 30, at 194.
39. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override and Democracy,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 470 (2003) (suggesting other nations might have a
different experience with an override provision).
40. The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities that was recently adopted
in Victoria, Australia, contains an override provision. See Charter of Human Rights
and Responsibilities Act, 2006, § 31 (Vict.). This provision is radically different to
that found in the Canadian Charter, however, because in all other respects, the
Victorian Charter is a declaration of incompatibility model of rights protection. The
override provision in this context simply provides formal recognition that Parliament
can enact legislation that is incompatible with the Charter. For discussion of this
legislation, see Simon Evans, The Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities
and the ACT Human Rights Act: Four Key Differences and their Implications for
Victoria (June 21, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://acthra.anu.edu.au/artices/Simon%20Evans%20%2OVic%20Charter%20and%
20the%20ACTHRA.pdf.
41. See generally Hogg & Bushell, supra note 9; ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON
TRIAL, supra note 9, Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues
Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. B. REV. 481 (2001).
[Vol. 32:2
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Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is
often referred to as the "reasonable limitation" provision. This clause
provides that rights guaranteed by the Charter are subject to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society., 42 In practice, this means that
Charter rights can be limited by legislation that meets the standards
that the Supreme Court of Canada has set for section 1 justification.
According to the Supreme Court, a law can only be justified as a
"reasonable limit" on Charter rights if it satisfies a proportionality
test; that is, the law must pursue an important objective, be rationally
connected with that objective, impair Charter rights no more than
necessary to accomplish the objective, and not have a
disproportionately severe effect on the persons to whom it applies.43
Most disputes center on the third part of this test, namely, the
minimal impairment requirement. 4 When a law is invalidated using
section 1, the reason tends to be that the court concludes that the
relevant legislative objective was not pursued by the least restrictive
means available, rather than viewing that objective as improper or
insufficiently important. As a result, legislatures are commonly left
with the ability to re-enact legislation afresh that pursues the same
objective but by less invasive means.
Weak-form dialogue theorists claim that the reasonable
limitation provision contained in section 1 of the Charter promotes
''an expansive and constructive conversation" between the branches
both because it allows legislatures to defend statutory provisions as
reasonable limits on Charter rights, and because it provides them with
the dialogic opportunity to respond to the judicial invalidation of
statutory provisions by devising legislation that pursues the same
objectives by less restrictive means.45 Section 1 is thus thought to
"allow[] courts to bring concerns about respecting rights to the
attention of governments" while also "allow[ing] governments to
explain to the courts and the people their regulatory ambitions, the
42. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1, sec. 1 (1982).
43. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,138-39 (Can.).
44. See Hogg & Bushell, supra note 9, at 85.
45. ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 293. See also Hogg &
Bushell, supra note 9, at 84-87 (outlining the dialogic features of section 1). This is a
less distinctive provision on which to ground inter-branch dialogue theory in Canada
because a similar structure of rights exists across constitutional systems. See generally
Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2007).
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alternatives considered and the tradeoffs made." Similar to the
theories of inter-branch dialogue proposed in relation to the section
33 override, it is also expected that both judges and legislators will
make a normative choice to engage in dialogue with each other and
learn from their mutual conversations under section 1.
Unlike the situation with section 33, weak-form dialogue
theorists in Canada have been able to point to a range of cases in
which courts have invalidated legislation on section 1 grounds, with
legislatures responding by amending the offending provisions to
pursue the same objectives by less restrictive means.47 Nevertheless,
critics have been effective in showing that even in such cases, the
interactions between the branches are difficult to describe as
genuinely dialogic in nature. For example, legislative amendments
often merely incorporate judicial suggestions when a law has been
invalidated under section 1, which appears more akin to legislative
acquiescence than genuine dialogue in the sense envisaged by weak-
form dialogue theorists.' Simple failures to respond are also not
uncommon, even in those cases where section 1 analysis has left clear
space for a legislative response. 49
Legislative acquiescence or failures to respond under section 1
might simply demonstrate that Canadian legislatures agree with the
judiciary's Charter rulings. Given the frequency of this kind of
behavior, however, it seems more probable that legislatures are either
unwilling or unable to engage in productive and honest dialogue with
the judiciary about the meaning of Charter rights and the best way to
balance these rights against competing objectives. This anecdotal
evidence thus indicates that judges and legislatures do not regularly
or consistently behave in a way that realizes any dialogic potential of
section 1, just as they do not in relation to section 33. It therefore
seems likely that the failure of the override to promote dialogue
between the branches is not solely the consequence of historical
circumstance, but may also stem from more fundamental flaws in the
normative assumptions of weak-form dialogue theory.
46. ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 13.
47. See, e.g., Hogg & Bushell, supra note 9, at 96-98; ROACH, SUPREME COURT
ON TRIAL, supra note 9.
48. See, e.g., Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue:
A Response to Hogg and Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 513, 525 (1999) (arguing
that "legislative compliance through legislative sequels allows the judiciary's
interpretation of the Charter to go unchallenged.").
49. Id. at 520.
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B. The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act, 1998 -
The Declaration of Incompatibility Model
The second leading weak-form approach to judicial review is the
declaration of incompatibility model adopted in the United Kingdom
with the passage of the Human Rights Act of 1998 ("HRA"). ° The
HRA, which came into force on October 1, 2000, was a key element
of the newly enacted Labour government's platform to take human
rights seriously.5 The way in which this goal should be achieved
posed something of a dilemma, however, given the government's twin
desire to retain the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which is
considered to be the foundational principle of British
constitutionalism. 2  Although the Canadian Charter was highly
influential in early debates about the form that a bill of rights should
take, it was ultimately thought to provide too much power to the
judiciary at the expense of Parliament given that it empowers judges
to strike down conflicting legislation. 3 On the other hand, supporters
of a British bill of rights did not favor the enactment of an ordinary
statute as this was considered unlikely to provide sufficient protection
for rights.
Faced with these concerns, the HRA represents a novel solution
to the problem of reconciling parliamentary supremacy with the
judicial protection of fundamental rights. Designed to incorporate
the principal human rights provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("Convention") into domestic British law, the Act
creates a statutory charter of rights in the United Kingdom that is
broadly comparable in content to other national bills of rights.54 The
power that the HRA grants to the judiciary is, however, much more
limited than in other nations. First, section 3 of the HRA directs
judges to interpret primary (as well as secondary) legislation "so far
as it is possible to do so... in a way which is compatible with the
50. Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42 (U.K.).
51. See LABOUR PARTY, MANIFESTO 1997, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
election97/background/ parties/manlab/91abmanconst.html.
52. See Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, 1997, Cm. 3782, reprinted
in JOHN WADHAM & HELEN MOUNTFORD, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT 1998 (2d ed., 2001).
53. FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS AGE: THE STORY OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM'S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 152-63 (2000).
54. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Articles 1 and 13 of the European
Convention were not incorporated into the Human Rights Act.
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Convention rights."55 If a court concludes that this is not possible and
that the primary legislation is incompatible with a Convention right,
the HRA does not allow the court to set aside the legislation.
Instead, section 4 restricts the court to issuing a formal declaration of
that incompatibility. 6  In the event that a declaration of
incompatibility is made, the legislation in question continues to have
full effect and validity and it is left to independent political judgment
to decide whether the law should be amended in light of the court's
ruling and, if so, how. 7 If a decision is made to amend the legislation,
in the ordinary course of events this will be done through the regular
parliamentary process. If a more urgent response is desired, however,
the HRA also provides for a "fast track" procedure that permits the
relevant minister to amend the incompatible legislation by a
"remedial order" that is laid before and approved by both Houses of
Parliament. 8
The issue of judicial enforcement is the most innovative feature
of the HRA. Similar to the Canadian system, courts are positioned to
have the penultimate say about protected rights. Nevertheless,
whereas the judiciary's penultimate say in Canada is legally
authoritative unless overturned by the legislature, in the United
Kingdom the judiciary's penultimate say only becomes law if
Parliament decides to amend the conflicting legislation to remove the
incompatibility. 9 The declaration of incompatibility mechanism is
55. Similar interpretive provisions have been routinely included in the
declaration of incompatibility systems recently adopted in other jurisdictions. See
Human Rights Act, 2004, § 30(1) (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (providing that when "working
out the meaning of a Territory law, an interpretation that is consistent with human
rights is to be preferred to any other interpretation."); Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act, 2006, § 32(1) (Vict.) ("So far as it is possible to do so
consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way
that is compatible with human rights.").
56. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(1)-(2) (U.K.). This provision only applies
to primary (or parliamentary) legislation. If a court concludes that secondary
legislation (or legislation resulting from Parliament's delegation of its powers to the
executive branch) is incompatible with a Convention right, it may fashion relief that
removes that incompatibility unless primary legislation prevent this. In that case, the
court may only make a declaration of incompatibility. See id. § 4(3)-(4).
57. Id. § 4(6) (providing that a declaration of incompatibility "does not affect the
validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is
given.").
58. See id. § 10 and sched. 2 (outlining the complex procedures for a remedial
order to be made).
59. See Perry, supra note 4, at 670 (discussing the difference in penultimate
authority between courts and legislatures under the Canadian and British rights
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accordingly both "less straightforward and direct than the Canadian
override in that a legislature is not simply faced with the option of
overturning or preempting a court decision, for there is no binding
decision without parliamentary response to the declaration of
incompatibility. ",0
The unique way in which the HRA distributes power between
the judiciary and the political branches of government has led many
British scholars, similar to their Canadian counterparts, to argue that
the Act establishes the structural foundations for inter-branch
dialogue. 6'  Given the young age of the statute, the theoretical
discussion of dialogue remains somewhat underdeveloped compared
to Canadian scholarship. The work that has been produced thus far
nevertheless appears to rely on similar normative behavioral
assumptions to those underpinning Canadian weak-form dialogue
theory.
The key feature of the HRA that is considered to provide an
"engine" for dialogue is the declaration of incompatibility provision
contained in section 4.62 As noted above, when judges determine that
legislation is incompatible with Convention rights and that it is not
possible to interpret it in a consistent manner, section 4 enables them
to express this conclusion by issuing a non-binding declaration of
incompatibility. Although this is a weaker form of judicial power
than the power to strike down legislation, dialogue proponents
nevertheless praise the declaration of incompatibility mechanism for
instruments).
60. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 739.
61. Scholars who refer to the concept of dialogue under the HRA include
Richard Clayton, Judicial Deference and "Democratic Dialogue": The Legitimacy of
Intervention Under the Human Rights Act 1998, 2004 PUB. L. 33 (U.K.); Richard A.
Edwards, Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act, 65 M.L.R. 859 (2002);
Sandra Fredman, Judging Democracy: The Role of the Judiciary under the HRA 1998,
53 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 99 (2000); Tom R. Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue,
Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998, 2005 PUB. L. 306 (U.K.);
Murray Hunt, The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal
Profession, 26 J.L. SOC'Y 86 (1999); KLUG, supra note 53; Francesca Klug, The
Human Rights Act - a "third way" or "third wave" Bill of Rights, 2001 Eur. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 361; Danny Nicol, Are Convention Rights a No-Go Zone for Parliament?,
2002 PUB. L. 438 (U.K.); Danny Nicol, Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act,
2006 PUB. L. 722 (U.K.) [hereinafter Nicol, Law and Politics]; Keir Starmer, Two
Years of the Human Rights Act, 2003 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 14.
62. Hickman, supra note 61, at 308; see also Clayton, supra note 61, at 46 ("[T]he
principle of 'democratic dialogue' is implicit in the structural features of the Act.").
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enabling courts to inject their "important but not decisive"63
perspective into debates about the meaning and interpretation of
Convention rights.6' In fact, British theorists suggest that this weaker
form of judicial power can actually improve prospects for inter-
branch dialogue because it lessens the risk that legislatures will
blindly acquiesce to judicial pronouncements on rights.6"
Unlike the situation in Canada, where the overall structure of the
Charter is now praised for facilitating inter-branch dialogue, British
dialogue theorists have not been universally positive about all of the
structural features of the HRA. In particular, some have expressed
concern about the effect of section 3 of the HRA on productive
dialogue between the branches. 66 On its face, section 3 requires
courts to take a strong interpretive approach to ensure that legislative
provisions are interpreted compatibly with Convention rights
whenever this is possible. There nonetheless remains significant
latitude in relation to how narrowly or widely judges might read this
provision.67 Taken to the extreme, section 3 might be construed
exceedingly narrowly so that its mandate is effectively "reduced to an
empty shell."' Alternatively, the provision might be read so broadly
63. Fredman, supra note 61, at 119.
64. The precise roles that judges and legislators should play are not as highly
theorized in British as in Canadian dialogue theory. In general, it appears to be
commonly thought that judges have an important contribution to make as guardians
of principle because legislators are not well suited to this task. See Hickman, supra
note 61; Edwards, supra note 61. Others suggest that both judges and legislators can
play important roles in relation to principle yet learn from each other's unique
institutional perspective. See Nicol, Law and Politics, supra note 61.
65. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 61, at 867 (arguing that the Human Rights
Act's dialogic structure, leaving the final word with Parliament and the executive,
"reduc[es] the chances of judicial imperium"); Nicol, Law and Politics, supra note 61,
at 747 ("Section 4 declarations ... enable courts to influence political debate without
stifling it").
66. See, e.g., Klug, Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998, 2003
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125 [hereinafter Klug, Judicial Deference]; Nicol, Law and
Politics, supra note 61.
67. See, e.g., Richard Clayton, The Limits of What's Possible: Statutory
Construction under the Human Rights Act, 2002 EUR. HUM. RTS L. REV. 559; Conor
Gearty, Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights, 118 L. Q. REV.
248 (2002); CONOR GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTERPRETATION
(2005); Aileen Kavanagh, The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation
under the Human Rights Act 1998, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (2004).
68. Gearty, Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights, supra note
67, at 250; see also David Bonner, Helen Fenwick & Sonia Harris-Short, Judicial
Approaches to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT'L & COMi'. L.Q. 549, 555 (2003)
("[Section 3] can be characterized idiomatically as a 'bend me, shape me' clause,
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that all legislation is interpreted as compatible with Convention rights
unless it is expressly stated not to be.
Weak-form dialogue theorists in the United Kingdom tend to
disfavor expansive interpretations of section 3 on the basis that this
would leave little space for the operation of dialogue between the
branches using the declaration of incompatibility tool.69 This is not to
say that inter-branch "dialogue" cannot occur under section 3; after
all, it always remains open to Parliament to enact new legislation that
modifies a section 3 interpretation if it forms the view that the
judiciary's actions do not reflect an appropriate interpretation of
rights or do not strike the optimal balance between rights and
competing objectives.' Weak-form dialogue theorists nevertheless
tend to consider that frequent use of the section 3 interpretive power
by courts is less democratically desirable than section 4 declarations
of incompatibility because this would render judicial views final
unless or until overturned by Parliament, thereby "shift[ing] too far
towards a constitutional democracy."71 In addition, if a convention
were to develop in favor of courts interpreting section 3 very broadly,
it is thought that this might lead judges to favor strained and less
transparent interpretations rather than express their sincere views
about the incompatibility of legislation with protected rights using
their declaratory powers."
In line with these views, British dialogue theorists counsel the
branches, particularly the judiciary, to make certain normative
behavioral choices to ensure that genuine and open dialogue between
treating legislation as highly malleable material that can be moulded through
'interpretation' to achieve a better 'fit' with the intended receptacle (the Convention
rights)").
69. Klug, Judicial Deference, supra note 66, at 130 (suggesting that frequent use
of section 3 "to effectively rewrite legislation ... will undermine the careful balance
set in motion by the Act."). Cf Gavin Phillipson, (Mis)-reading section 3 of the
Human Rights Act, 119 L. Q. REV. 183, 187 (2003) (arguing that section 3 should be
interpreted broadly "so that it virtually always achieves Convention compliance,"
leaving little space for resort to section 4).
70. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 61, at 46; Hickman, supra note 61, at 326-29
(suggesting that sections 3 and 4 simply allow for different kinds of inter-branch
dialogue).
71. See Alison Young, Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza: Avoiding the Deference Trap,
2005 PUB. L. 23, 33 (U.K.); see also ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 9,
at 64-65; Nicol, Law and Politics, supra note 61, at 747-48.
72. See Thomas Poole, Bills of Rights in Australia, 4 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 197,203 (2004).
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them is achieved.73 If judges form the sincere view that legislation is
incompatible with protected rights after listening to Parliament's
justifications for the measures, they should strive to make use of
section 4 declarations of incompatibility to the extent that this is
possible.74 It is then expected that Parliament will listen to and take
account of the judiciary's unique perspective before deciding whether
to amend or repeal the statute in question. If, despite the judiciary's
input, Parliament believes that its original legislative choices were
sufficiently protective of rights, then it need take no action.75 Similar
to the process of dialogue envisaged under the Canadian Charter, it is
thought that if the branches behave in this way, a collaborative
process of dialogue will result "that involves input from each body at
different junctures and... take[s] a conversational form.,
76
Just as in Canada, however, it remains unclear whether the
judiciary and Parliament in the United Kingdom can or do behave in
a way that is consistent with the normative behavioral assumptions of
weak-form dialogue theory. If the judiciary and Parliament were
following dialogue theorists' prescriptions, we would expect to find
significant uses of the section 4 declaration of incompatibility power -
in preference to section 3 interpretations - together with responses to
judicial declarations that reflect considered and independent
parliamentary judgment. Consistent with Canadian experience,
current experience with the HRA provides only equivocal support for
these behavioral claims. Specifically, in the six years since the HRA
came into force, British courts have made fairly equal use of their
powers under sections 3 and 4. On the one hand, section 3 has been
used fourteen times to interpret legislation so that it is compatible
73. See, e.g., Nicol, Law and Politics, supra note 61, at 742 ("These institutions, it
is hoped, should engage in a common enterprise, fostering an ongoing dialogue to
establish which arguments deserve recognition in the rights discourse.") (emphasis
added).
74. See, e.g., id. at 744 ("[C]ourts should uncompromisingly tell their truth on
human rights."). Weak-form dialogue theorists in the United Kingdom thus counsel
courts to make "more rather than fewer," even "routine," uses of section 4
declarations of incompatibility rather than relying too heavily on section 3. See
Gearty, Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights, supra note 67, at
250; Klug, Judicial Deference, supra note 66, at 131.
75. Nicol, Law and Politics, supra note 61, at 743 (describing dialogue in which
"courts present their thoughtful opinions on rights, which Parliament can substitute
with its own favoured interpretation.").
76. Hickman, supra note 61, at 309; see also id. at 335 ("[Tlhe various branches




with Convention rights.77  In contrast, fifteen declarations of
incompatibility have been issued under section 4 that have not been
overturned on appeal."
Although the relatively equal number of cases involving section 3
and section 4 of the Human Rights Act is likely to be of some concern
to weak-form dialogue theorists, these figures at least indicate that
judges have felt prepared to make use of their section 4 powers to
clearly speak out when they consider that legislation is incompatible
with protected rights. Greater doubts about the behavioral
assumptions underpinning weak-form dialogue theory emerge when
we consider the responses that these declarations have elicited from
the political branches of government. If Parliament were responding
in the manner advocated by weak-form dialogue theorists, we would
expect to see disagreement with judicial declarations being regularly
expressed or, at the very least, on occasion. Contrary to these
expectations, however, the British Parliament has almost universally
responded to judicial declarations of incompatibility by amending or
repealing the relevant primary legislation in accordance with the
court's ruling. The only instances in which such action has not yet
been forthcoming are recent decisions in which remedial measures
are presently under parliamentary consideration and are expected to
be enacted in due course.79 In combination with the Canadian
experience, the British example thus reinforces concerns that the
normative behavioral assumptions of weak-form dialogue theory may
be fundamentally flawed.
77. See United Kingdom, Department of Constitutional Affairs, Table of Cases;
Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [20041 2 A.C. 557 (H.L.) (Steyn, L.J., appendix to
judgment); Hugh Tomlinson QC, Human Rights Act Now We Are Six: Case Law on
Convention Rights (Oct. 2, 2006).
78. See United Kingdom, Department of Constitutional Affairs, Table of Cases,
supra note 77; Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (H.L.) (Steyn, L.J.,
appendix to judgment); Tomlinson, supra note 77. There are also six additional cases
in which a declaration of incompatibility was made in relation to primary legislation
that was subsequently overturned on appeal. See United Kingdom, Department of
Constitutional Affairs, Table of Cases, supra note 77.
79. See R (on the application of Gabaj) v. First Secretary of State, [2006] EWHC
(Admin) (unreported); R (on the application of Morris) v. Westminster City Council,
[2006] 1 W.L.R. 505.
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HI. The Lessons of Positive Theory
In order to shed greater light on the question of whether the
normative behavioral assumptions of weak-form dialogue theory are
realistic, this Part turns to positive theory to explore what forms of
behavior we can actually expect of judges and legislators under weak-
form instruments. Positive theory is a particularly useful tool for this
task because rather than focusing on how the judiciary and the
legislature should act, it centers more directly on what judicial and
legislative actors actually do when performing their decision-making
roles.' In so doing, positive theory also illuminates the various forces
that impact on judicial decision-making and enables us to scrutinize
the range of incentives and motivations that are likely to drive judicial
and legislative action. As we will see, when these insights are applied
to the context of weak-form models of judicial review, it becomes
clear that the central assumptions about judicial and legislative
behavior that underlie weak-form dialogue theory are almost
certainly unsound.
A. Positive Theory and Institutional Behavior
1. The Separation of Powers Game
Over the last two decades, positive scholars, particularly in the
United States, have produced a substantial body of work examining
the diverse influences on judicial decision-making and the factors that
motivate judges when exercising their judicial review powers."' Some
of this work focuses on influences that are internal to judges or that
result from intra-judicial relationships, either between judges sitting
on a particular court or between courts at different levels in the
judicial hierarchy." Another branch of positive scholarship focuses
on the position of the judiciary in the separation of powers context.83
80. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
81. For detailed discussions of the varying strands of positive theory and its
application to legal scholarship, see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review,
84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) [hereinafter Friedman, Politics].
82. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000) (examining the internal dynamics of Supreme
Court decision-making); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (presenting the "attitudinal model,"
which claims that judges decide cases based solely on ideology).
83. See generally Tonja Jacobi, The Impact of Positive Political Theory on Old
Questions of Constitutional Law and the Separation of Powers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
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This theoretical approach holds significant promise to help us
understand the behavior of judges and legislators in weak-form
systems of judicial review, not only because it sheds light on external,
inter-branch influences on judicial decision-making, but also because
it helps us to understand important aspects of the behavior of the
political branches when reacting to judicial rulings.
Positive political theorists who study judicial decision-making in
the separation of powers context use rational choice methods to
model law-making as a game of strategy in which the three branches
of government, as rational actors, seek to achieve their goals in the
face of institutional constraints and imperfect information. ' These
models are often referred to as the "separation of powers game."85
Although the models can be very complex, the basic premise of this
approach is that because the three branches of government are
embedded in a system of separated powers in which each branch can
check or constrain the others, they cannot achieve their own
preferences without taking the preferences of the others into
account.' These preferences are most commonly defined as policy-
based, but can also encompass broader institutional or legal goals.'
259 (2006); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 28, 28-33 (1997).
84. See generally, Jacobi, supra note 83; Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs &
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to
Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 43 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999).
85. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional
Influences on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (special issue) (1990); John
Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn &
Weingast, Positive Theory].
86. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 17 (1998)
("[W]e cannot fully understand the choices justices make unless we also consider the
institutional context in which they operate."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (1994) ("Congress, the
executive, and the courts ... seek[] to promote [their] vision of the public interest,
but only as that vision can be achieved within a complex, interactive setting in which
each organ of government is both cooperating with and competing with the other
organs.").
87. For this reason, it has been accepted that judges might focus on maximizing
"their legal or political preferences, or something else entirely." Frank B. Cross &
Blake L. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95
Nw. U.L. REV. 1437, 1446 (2001).
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Faced with this potential implementation problem, the branches can
be expected to engage in anticipated response calculations, which
simply means that they will strategically anticipate the likely
responses of other institutional players to their decisions and adjust
their actions accordingly."
In explaining how the strategic dynamics of the separation of
powers game operate in practice, positive scholars have tended to
focus on strong-form models of judicial review and, in particular, the
United States system. In order to understand the core claims of this
account, it is therefore helpful to begin with the strong-form example.
The following Section will then consider more directly how the
strategic interplay between the branches might be expected to vary in
the context of weak-form judicial review.
At first glance it is difficult to see why judges would act
strategically in a strong-form system of judicial review, given that
their constitutional rulings cannot be overturned by ordinary
legislative means. This claim becomes more familiar, however, once
we recollect Hamilton's famous refrain that the judiciary is the "least
dangerous branch" of government because judges possess neither the
power of the "purse" nor of the "sword." 89 Lacking the power of
enforcement, judges must rely on the political branches to ensure that
their rulings are effective.' In this vein, social scientists have
highlighted a variety of constraints under which judges in strong-form
systems operate when undertaking constitutional review.
Taking the United States as our example, although the only way
to achieve formal revision of constitutional rulings in that country is
by constitutional amendment,9' the elected branches have a variety of
more informal tools at their disposal to discipline the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, in the event of disagreement with its
88. See generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT
145-46 (1999) (discussing the "rule of anticipated reactions").
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (John P. Kaninski &
Richard Leffler eds., 1989).
90. See, e.g., BRADLEY CANON & CHARLES JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 1 (1999) ("[I]n virtually all instances, courts that
formulate policies must rely on other courts or on non-judicial actors to translate
these policies into action.").
91. This is a notoriously difficult and time-consuming procedure that has only
been successfully invoked on four occasions. See LouIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 201-06 (1988).
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rulings.9' Congress and other governmental actors can evade judicial
decisions by failing or refusing to take implementation action, or by
passing legislation in defiance of judicial rulings. They can also
attempt to pack the courts in an effort to alter judicial policy, or
reduce or withdraw the jurisdiction of courts in controversial areas. 93
Judges can also be impeached or removed, judicial salaries or funding
to the courts can be reduced, and efforts can be made to appoint
judges who are more sympathetic to the constitutional policy
preferences of the political branches.
Although most of these tools are not very targeted means of
response, this does not negate their power to constrain judicial
behavior because they are directed at the heart of the judiciary's
institutional integrity.9 Tools which attack the Court reflect the fact
that the judiciary is dependent on the political branches not only to
implement its rulings, but also to sustain its institutional authority
within the constitutional order. While refusals to implement judicial
decisions do not punish the judiciary in the same way, they do counter
judicial preferences and undermine the future significance of judicial
rulings. The fact that these tools are rarely used also does not negate
from their potential force due to the phenomenon of anticipated
reactions. Judges remain aware that the bag of tools exists and can be
used against them if they stray too far from the preferred views of
political actors.9  According to the positive account of judicial
decision-making, judges can therefore be expected to think ahead and
anticipate what kinds of political responses are likely, adjusting their
rulings accordingly.'
92. See generally id. at ch. 6 (discussing the various forms of constraint on judicial
action).
93. The most well known example in United States history is President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's Supreme Court-packing plan. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 216 (Oxford Univesrity Press 1995).
94. See Cross & Nelson, supra note 87, at 1459-60 (observing that these tools
"strike at the very independence of the judiciary itself and the powers and resources
that judges require or strongly desire"); Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions
and the Strategic Environment of Judicial Review, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 446, 449 (2003)
("What is at issue in any decision to sanction the courts is the judiciary's institutional
integrity, not just the outcome of a particular case").
95. See, e.g., Cross & Nelson, supra note 87, at 1470 (discussing this effect of
failure to implement judicial decisions).
96. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 610 (2001) (providing empirical
support for the proposition that Supreme Court Justices "adjust their decisions in
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2. Impediments to Political Action
Thus far, the positive account of judicial decision-making in
strong-form systems appears to indicate that where judicial and
political branch preferences diverge, we would expect to find judges
engaging in anticipated responses to avoid the risk of punishment by
political actors. One consequence of this would be that we would
rarely expect to see open conflict between the political branches and
the judiciary when judges render constitutional decisions. It is clear
that this is not a sufficient explanation of judicial - legislative
interactions, however, as history is replete with examples of
constitutional courts in strong-form systems handing down decisions
that are criticized or openly attacked by the political branches. While
some of this might be explained by incomplete information available
to judges about political branch preferences,7 it seems unlikely that
this is the complete story.
Consistent with this intuition, positive scholars have suggested
that when assessing the likelihood that constraints will be placed on
their actions, strategic justices will not limit themselves to considering
how far their own preferences diverge from those of the political
branches. In addition, and of equal importance, they can also be
expected to take into account the extent to which political actors are
both willing and able to act on their sincere preferences to overcome
judicial rulings. In other words, although the political branches may
have various ways they can respond to judicial decisions, if there are
significant structural or strategic impediments to effective political
action in a particular constitutional system, they may be unwilling or
unable to use these tools. To the extent that this is true, judges will
have a greater degree of freedom to pursue their own understandings,
even when these diverge from immediate political preferences, and
will accordingly be less likely to engage in anticipated response
calculations.
Structural barriers to effective political action result from those
institutional features of a political system that make it difficult for the
anticipation of the potential responses from the other branches of government").
When adjusting their actions, judges can be expected to look to the preferences of the
existing legislature, rather than the enacting legislature, as the existing legislature will
be the one to act against the judiciary in the event of disagreement. See Ferejohn &
Weingast, Positive Theory, supra note 85, at 270 (noting that under positive theory,
"the preference configuration of the current legislature is far more important for the
results of statutory interpretation than is that of the enacting legislature.").
97. See, e.g., Maltzman et al., supra note 84, at 49.
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legislature to act, even when a majority of legislators do not support
what the judiciary has done in a particular case.98 The critical factor in
this regard is the number of veto points there are in the policy-making
process that allow specified institutional actors to block changes to
the status quo.9 As the number of these veto points grows, the
number of "veto players" who must cooperate to ensure the passage
of legislation also increases. ' °°  The consequence of this is that
legislation will only be passed if all of the veto players agree that the
proposed political solution is preferable to that chosen by the court.
If any of the veto players consider that the proposed legislative
alternative is less desirable than the solution chosen by the court, then
political "gridlock" will result and passage of the legislation will be
halted.""1 In these circumstances, the judicial ruling will stand, even if
it conflicts with the preferences of a legislative majority.
One structural aspect of political systems that influences the
number of veto points and the resulting potential for gridlock is the
extent to which power is divided horizontally between the legislature
and the executive." As a general rule, the potential for gridlock
increases as one moves from pure parliamentary systems towards the
presidential model. In parliamentary systems which unite legislative
and executive power, the prime minister commonly gives orders to
members of his or her own party to enact government-sponsored
legislation, which forestalls serious challenges through the legislative
process.' 3 These dynamics are reinforced by the fact that strong party
discipline tends to be a common feature of the parliamentary
98. See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S.
LAWMAKING (1998); Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 85.
99. See KREHBIEL, supra note 98, at ch.6 (discussing "veto pivots" in the
lawmaking process in the United States).
100. See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: How POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK
(2002).
101. KREHBIEL, supra note 98, at 26 (defining gridlock as "the absence of policy
change in equilibrium in spite of the existence of a legislative majority that favors
change.").
102. Other structural aspects of political systems that influence the number of veto
points are the structure of the committee system in the legislative branch and
fragmentation of political parties. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 85; Rafael
Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court with
Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263
(1990); Maltzman et al., supra note 84, at 46-47.
103. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 212-23 (2000)
(discussing how "separating power causes government to proceed more by bargains
and less by orders").
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model."u In presidential systems, in contrast, presidents typically
have some kind of veto power over legislation, with the result that the
legislature and the executive must negotiate to a greater extent over
proposed laws."'5
The number of veto points in a political system and the potential
for gridlock is also influenced by whether a system is unicameral or
bicameral.'" While only one set of legislators must agree on a course
of action in a unicameral system, both houses must concur in a
bicameral system, at least where the constitution gives veto power to
the upper chamber. Layering this structural feature of political
systems on to the first, we can generally predict that there will be the
least potential for gridlock in unicameral parliamentary systems,
slightly more gridlock potential in bicameral parliamentary systems,
more again in unicameral presidential systems, culminating in the
greatest potential for gridlock in nations with bicameral presidential
systems.' 7
In addition to structural considerations, positive scholars have
also suggested a broad range of strategic incentives motivating
political respect for judicial rulings. Just as with the structural factors
considered above, where these incentives are effective we can expect
to find frequent political compliance with or implementation of
judicial decisions, even where they diverge significantly from
immediate political preferences. In turn, judges will retain significant
strategic freedom to pursue their own preferences in specific cases.
The nature of the strategic incentives motivating political respect
for judicial rulings can be expected to vary depending on the specific
institutional and political dynamics of a constitutional system. For
example, in some jurisdictions, the legislature might want to maintain
104. See, e.g., id. at 212-13; JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 4
(1999) (discussing the necessity for bargaining between equal upper and lower houses
in a bicameral system).
105. See John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 58 (2002) (discussing how "power tends to be more fragmented
in presidential than in parliamentary systems); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation
of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 645-48 (describing how presidential systems have
a tendency to come to a political impasse).
106. See, e.g., COOTER, supra note 103, at 223-25 (discussing the necessity for
bargaining between the upper and lower houses of the legislature in a bicameral
system).
107. Another factor that may increase barriers to action in a political system is the
committee system in the legislative branch. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note
85; and Gely & Spiller, supra note 102.
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an independent judiciary and ensure the future significance of its
rulings as an "insurance policy against future electoral defeat."'
' 8
Legislative majorities might also gain an informational advantage
from active judicial review because judges can signal information
about the concrete effects of legislation that was unavailable when the
law was enacted.'O° In other contexts, political actors might want to
avoid responsibility for difficult decisions by passing them to an
independent judiciary for resolution."0 Relying on an independent
judiciary can also allow them to achieve policy goals that are too
controversial to pursue by other means. A further important
incentive, specific to federal political systems, is that a federal
government might value an independent judiciary for its role in
monitoring the actions of sub-national governments or ensuring that
the federation remains a successful one."'
One of the most powerful forces leading political actors to
enforce judicial rulings in the face of conflicting preferences, and one
which is likely to be found in the overwhelming majority of
constitutional systems, is high levels of public support for an
independent judiciary."2 The reason why this is such a compelling
incentive does require some explanation, however, given that history
has shown, on multiple occasions and in a diverse range of nations,
108. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions, supra note 94, at 454; see also J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); Matthew C. Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns... ": The
Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 85
(2003) ("[ljndependent judicial review serves a valuable insurance function for
competitors in a stable democracy.").
109. James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of
Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 84 (2001) (developing a signaling
game of legislative-judicial interaction based on the information potential of judicial
review).
110. See Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference
to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 35 (1993) [hereinafter Graber, The Non-
Majoritarian Difficulty] (arguing that political leaders can get the courts to resolve
controversial issues and hopefully get the resolution to "stick" in a way that allows
the dominant coalition to be held together); Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your
Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United
States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 583 (2005) (arguing that judicial review
might be supported by existing power holders when current elected officials are
obstructed from fully implementing their own policy agenda).
111. See Whittington, supra note 94, at 456-59.
112. See generally VANBERG, supra note 14, at ch.2 (2005); Georg Vanberg,
Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review,
45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 346 (2001).
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that legislatures can frequently gain political capital by acting against
the judiciary when its decisions run counter to popular views. The
public support thesis nevertheless suggests that popular sentiment for
an independent judiciary may actually protect it from political
override or sanctions in a wide range of circumstances, even if the
public disagrees with individual judicial rulings."3
In order to understand this, we need to delve further into the
mechanics of popular support. In this regard, social scientists have
divided popular support for the judiciary into two components:
specific and diffuse support.114 Specific support refers to satisfaction
with particular judicial rulings. Diffuse support, in contrast, refers to
the more general support a national judiciary holds as an institution,
distinct from its individual rulings.
Although research in this area has a number of limitations,
principally related to the difficulties involved in separating the two
forms of support, studies suggest that a dynamic relationship exists
between specific and diffuse support. Diffuse support is "an attitude
that evolves over time," due to the slow accretion of positive
messages about the judiciary and its constitutional role.'15 As a result,
consistent specific support for judicial decisions can eventually lead to
the acquisition of high levels of diffuse support over time." 6 Once
diffuse support has been established, it is deeper and more constant
than specific support and tends to be insulated to a significant extent
from shifting views about particular judicial rulings. This means that
if a national judiciary has been successful in building up diffuse
support, it will be provided with some protection from popular
disagreement with specific decisions."7 Indeed, this appears to be
113. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Vanessa A. Baird, On the
Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 343 (1998) ("[W]ith
limited institutional resources, courts are . . . uncommonly dependent upon the
goodwill of their constituents for both support and compliance."); Walter Murphy &
John Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985
(1990); See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse or the Sword: Dynamics of
Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1209 (1986)
(suggesting that the backing force for the judiciary is public support).
114. See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965).
For a detailed analysis of the political science literature concerning the connection
between specific and diffuse support, see Friedman, Politics, supra note 81, at 325-28.
115. Gibson et al., supra note 113, at 345.
116. Id. at 349-52.
117. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, JOSEPH TANENHAUS, & DANIEL L. KASTNER,
PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
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what has occurred in most advanced Western democracies, where
courts tend to enjoy considerable public support, particularly when
compared to levels of public support for the other branches of
government."'
While this is the general rule, there does appear to be a
distinction between how positive and negative reactions to specific
rulings affect diffuse support. Although both kinds of reactions
influence levels of support, negative reactions appear to be more
readily forgotten, even if intensely held, whereas positive reactions
tend to stick in the public consciousness over the longer term. 9 The
overall effect of these dynamics is that if a national judiciary has
successfully built up diffuse support over time, it will have a greater
degree of freedom to render unpopular rulings on occasion without
risking significant dips in its levels of diffuse support.2 The political
branches, in turn, will find it difficult to act against the judiciary in
specific cases given the risk of electoral backlash, at least where
citizens are aware of the judicial decision in question and are able to
monitor political attempts at evasion.12 Where these twin conditions
are satisfied, popular support for the judiciary thus operates as a most
compelling incentive motivating political respect for judicial
decisions.
3. The Constrained Judiciary
The additional layer to the positive account of judicial and
political branch decision-making discussed in the previous Section
suggests that some combination of structural and strategic
impediments to political action is likely to prevent the political
branches from regularly acting against the judiciary in most strong-
form systems of judicial review, even in the event of significant
(Harry Eckstein et al. eds., 1973) (suggesting that specific support may be closely
correlated to diffuse support).
118. See, e.g., Gibson et al., supra note 113 (comparing the high levels of diffuse
support for the U.S. Supreme Court with that of other national constitutional courts).
119. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH L. REV.
2596, 2618 (2003) (describing negative reactions to judicial rulings as having a
"shorter half-life").
120. Gibson et al., supra note 113, at 356 ("It appears that satisfaction slowly
evolves into institutional legitimacy, and the degree of connection between specific
and diffuse support is contingent on the institution's age.").
121. See VANBERG, supra note 14, at 21 (proposing high levels of popular support
for the judiciary and citizen awareness of political attempts at evasion as the two
conditions "that tap separate dimensions of the enforcement problem").
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disagreement with judicial results. We might therefore expect that
judges in strong-form systems will be largely unconstrained in their
actions and retain wide latitude to establish their own understandings
as law. There are two reasons, however, why this conclusion is
flawed.
First, even if structural and strategic forces within a political
system are such that political actors will only infrequently act in
response to judicial rulings, this does not mean that they will never do
so. For example, even if an extensive set of veto points frequently
hinders the legislative policy-making process, political responses to
judicial decisions will still be possible if specific rulings were to
diverge dramatically from the ideal preferences of the various veto
players in the system. Strategic justices will also be aware that even if
political actors are routinely motivated not to act against the
judiciary, they might nevertheless calculate that the benefits of
independent judicial review are outweighed by its costs in particular
cases. Furthermore, although public support will often motivate
political actors to respect judicial rulings, it will be less likely to do so
where the citizenry are unaware of particular rulings and are unable
to effectively monitor political attempts at evasion. In all of these
circumstances, strategic justices will remain mindful that their
decisions can be overcome, and can therefore be expected to temper
their rulings in anticipation of such a result.
Secondly, even if justices in a particular system are not
significantly constrained vis-A-vis the political branches within the
constitutional system, this does not mean that they are not
constrained by other forces. In this regard, just as the dynamics of
popular support can constrain political action against the judiciary,
they can also act as a brake on judicial power.122 Given that public
support constitutes an important resource protecting the judiciary
from political attack, a concern to maintain this support is likely to
influence judicial behavior. Due to the way in which public support
operates, judges are also likely to be aware that popular responses to
specific rulings can have implications for diffuse support.1" This
recognition can thus be expected to lead judges to remain sensitive to
popular opinion, avoiding frequent decisions on highly salient issues
that conflict with popular attitudes so as to maintain and consolidate
122. See Friedman, Politics, supra note 81, at 320-28; PERETrI, supra note 88, at
163-84; VANBERG, supra note 14, at 49-53.
123. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
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their long-term support. 124
These hypotheses about the constraint of popular opinion on
judicial action are supported by empirical evidence. In the United
States, for example, where the majority of studies have been
undertaken, there is strong evidence that judicial rulings do not
deviate far from dominant popular opinion over the long term.25
Furthermore, if the two are in conflict, they do not stay this way for
long, with judicial outcomes tending to shift in line with popular
attitudes over time.126 This does not mean that judges will actually
track public opinion, or that they will not hand down unpopular
decisions on occasion. It does mean, however, that they are likely to
be aware that diffuse support may be lost if they were to hand down
too many unpopular rulings, leading to a greater risk of political
backlash in response. 7
In combination, these positive insights enable us to make a
number of general predictions about judicial and legislative
interactions in strong-form systems of judicial review. First and most
generally, because the three branches stand in a system of separated
powers, they can be expected to behave strategically in their
interactions with one another in order to maximize their chances of
establishing their preferences as law. Although the political branches
have a variety of tools they can use against the judiciary in the event
of disagreement with its decisions, the extent to which these are
124. See, e.g., PERETrI, supra note 88, at 181-82 (suggesting the Court will find
itself in difficulty if it repeatedly decides cases "out of sync with dominant public
opinion"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U.L.J. 569, 628 (2003) ("[A] strategic Justice will
realize that the decisions of the Court will be implemented by the other branches of
government only if they do not deviate too far from dominant public opinion.").
125. The precise dynamics of the connection between popular opinion and judicial
outcomes, however, remains poorly understood. See Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, supra note 119; Friedman, Politics, supra note 81, at 325.
126. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 190 (1989) ("[T]he
views of a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very
long with the views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country.");
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960) ("[I]t is hard
to find a single instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really
clear wave of public demand.").
127. See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994) (describing the enormous white "backlash" against
Brown); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court
Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1182 (2001) ("Supreme Court rulings often produce
unpredictable backlash effects.").
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ultimately used will depend on the various structural forces and/or
strategic incentives that can forestall or impede political action in a
particular national system. The greater the power of these forces, the
more freedom judges will have to establish their own understandings
as law without risking a political response.
Even in systems where structural forces and strategic incentives
are very strong, however, judicial freedom of action is not unlimited.
Instead, judges remain constrained both because they will be aware
that political responses will still be possible in certain cases, and
because a concern to maintain popular support is likely to keep
judicial rulings from shifting too far from popularly accepted views.
Accordingly, we can expect that judges will adjust their rulings in
order to avoid these results. In sum, therefore, the strategic dynamics
of strong-form systems can generally be predicted to "leave[] judges
reasonable discretion to effect their preferences in a single case but
keep[] them from going too far in too many cases or ignoring the
concerns of other institutions in general."1"
B. Positive Theory and the Dynamics of Weak-Form Systems of
Judicial Review
The fundamental precepts of positive theory, as gleaned from its
application to strong-form systems of judicial review, can be applied
to gain valuable insight into both the soundness of the normative
behavioral assumptions underlying weak-form dialogue theory and
the kinds of behavior we can in fact expect judges and legislators to
engage in under weak-form charters of rights. Most generally,
positive scholarship indicates that judges and legislators in all
constitutional systems can be expected to act strategically (or
interdependently) in their mutual interactions, regardless of the form
that a particular national bill of rights takes. Judges are likely to act
strategically when they realize that their fate rests on the preferences
and actions of other institutional actors, and adjust their rulings in
anticipation of the actions they expect those actors to take.
Legislators, in turn, are likely to engage in strategic calculations both
when determining whether successful political action is possible in
light of the preferences of the various veto players in the
constitutional system, and when weighing whether the costs of
responding to specific judicial rulings outweigh the benefits of such a
128. Cross & Nelson, supra note 87, at 1473; see also VANBERG, supra note 14, at




This claim that strategic behavior will be common across
constitutional systems does not mean that judges and legislators are
only capable of acting on the basis of strategic considerations. In
reality, it is likely that judges and legislative actors will be driven by a
complex and entwined set of factors of a legal, ideological and
strategic nature."3  Positive theory makes clear, however, that the
branches can be expected to choose optimal strategies if they want
their decisions to be effective, given the complex institutional
environment in which they operate. 3' While it would therefore be
incorrect to claim that judges and legislators can never act in a way
that is consistent with weak-form dialogue theory, the need for the
branches to adjust to their environment nonetheless indicates that it
will be rare to find judges and legislators in weak-form systems
regularly acting on the basis of any normative desire to engage in
inter-branch "dialogue" with one another.
The observation that judges and legislators are likely to act
strategically in making their decisional choices tells us little, however,
about the specific strategic moves that these actors are likely to make
under the different weak-form models of judicial review. In strong-
form systems, we have seen that the most important factors are likely
to be the nature of the structural and/or strategic impediments to
political action in a particular constitutional system and the operation
of public support for an independent judiciary. Further
consideration, however, must also be given to how the innovative
power-distributing mechanisms contained in weak-form bills of rights
might also affect strategic dynamics between the branches.
129. Legislators can and do, of course, act strategically in other ways, but
consideration here is limited to strategic responses to the judiciary.
130. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development
of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7 (1983) ("Judges'
decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they
ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do. Individuals
make decisions, but they do so within the context of group, institutional, and
environmental constraints.").
131. See Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretations:
Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies, 50 DuKE L.J. 1395, 1396 (2001)
("Incentives and institutional characteristics only conduce to behavior, they do not
determine it.").
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1. The Legislative Override Model
As observed previously, the structure of judicial review under the
legislative override model has important similarities with that found
in strong-form systems of judicial review. Of central importance in
both systems is the fact that the judiciary is empowered to strike
down legislation to enforce protected rights. The key difference of
import between the two models relates to the formal ability of the
legislature in an override system to overcome judicial rulings about
fundamental rights by an ordinary legislative majority.
Considering this structural feature in isolation, we might expect
that it would foster different strategic dynamics to those found in
strong-form systems of judicial review. As we have seen, aside from
the constitutional amendment power, the political branches in strong-
form systems are restricted to blunt sanctioning tools when they want
to respond to constitutional rulings of the judiciary.132 While these
tools can be very effective in constraining judges because they place
the judiciary's institutional integrity at risk, and not just the outcome
of a specific case, this fact is also likely to weigh heavily on legislators
when deciding whether sanctioning action should be pursued."' If
political actors are concerned to maintain the benefits of independent
judicial review in a particular system, it is likely they will have greater
difficulty reaching agreement that attacking the judiciary as an
institution is an appropriate or legitimate response. 34 Accordingly,
we would expect such sanctioning action to be relatively rare. The
override mechanism, in contrast, provides legislatures with a
seemingly easy and straightforward way to respond to and set aside
specific judicial rulings in a targeted fashion, focusing debate on the
merits of individual cases rather than on the more controversial issue
of the appropriate limits of judicial independence.135
The apparent ease with which the legislative override can be
132. See Whittington, supra note 94, at 449 ("The political power to sanction the
Court [in the United States] is a blunt instrument.").
133. See id. at 450.
134. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 93, at 132-62 (discussing Roosevelt's
failed "court-packing" plan of February 1937).
135. See, e.g., ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 33 ("The 1982
Canadian Charter . . . ensures that a determined government can quickly enact
effective replies to Court decisions."). Cf. Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or
Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 97 (2003) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Judicial Activism or Restraint] (suggesting that practical barriers may
nonetheless make it difficult for the legislature to use the override power).
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used compared to the blunt methods of response available in strong-
form systems does not mean, however, that we would expect to find
legislatures regularly employing this power. One potential
explanation for this rests on the phenomenon of anticipated reactions.
In the context of the override, judges would be aware that if
legislators made use of their override powers in a particular case, this
would represent a severe blow to the achievement of judicial goals.
In addition, if the override were to be used too frequently, this would
also send a strong signal about the judiciary's relative weakness as an
institution, thereby damaging its longer term legitimacy."3 In light of
this, judges can expected to calibrate their rulings in advance to
minimize the override's actual use.137
The formal ease with which a legislative override can be
employed thus suggests that it may operate as an effective constraint
on judicial behavior, perhaps an even more powerful form of
constraint than blunt sanctioning tools. This explanation is
incomplete, however, because we have not yet factored in the various
reasons why legislative actors may be unwilling, or unable, to make
ready use of a legislative override, despite its formal ease of use.
First, as observed previously, there may be structural features of the
constitutional system that promote political gridlock. The greater the
number of veto points there are in a particular constitutional system,
the more difficult it will be for a legislative majority to gain the
support of the various veto players such that use of the legislative
override is an appropriate response to individual judicial decisions.
Second, and of equal importance, we can expect that most
political systems will contain some variety of strategic incentives
motivating political respect for judicial rulings. These incentives
might stem, for example, from a desire to avoid responsibility for
difficult decisions or from a desire to achieve policy goals that are too
controversial to pursue by ordinary political means. A legislature
136. See, e.g., Christopher P. Manfredi, The Unfulfilled Promise of Dialogic
Constitutionalism: Judicial-Legislative Relationships under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS:
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 239, 253 (Tom Campbell
et al. eds., 2006); VANBERG, supra note 14, at 27.
137. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
Judicial Review Game, 88 Nw. U.L. REV. 382, 386 (1993) ("[A] rational Supreme
Court will usually interpret statutes and the Constitution in ways that avoid an
immediate override by the political process.").
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might still be able to achieve these goals even if it made isolated uses
of an override, given that such action does not directly attack the
judiciary's institutional integrity. Regular use of an override
mechanism to avoid judicial decisions is nevertheless likely to
undermine the future significance of judicial review because it would
send a clear signal that judicial views are frequently not worthy of
respect.3 1 If a legislature wants to maintain the benefits of
independent judicial review for its own purposes, it would therefore
be unlikely to resort to its override powers except on isolated
occasions.
Similar to strong-form systems of judicial review, the incentive
that is most likely to motivate legislative actors not to make use of an
override power is high levels of public support for the judiciary.
Although use of the override does not directly attack the judiciary as
an institution, the public is still likely to demand political compliance
with judicial rulings and disfavor uses of the override if they believe
that respect for judicial decisions is important.'39 It would also be
difficult for a legislature to hide use of an override from the public, at
least in relation to high salience cases. 4 ° In such circumstances,
judicial rulings striking down legislation and changing the law in
relation to a particular issue are likely to receive considerable media
attention, as are legislative debates about whether those rulings
should be overcome, thereby ensuring that the issue remains on the
public radar. Provided that levels of support for the judiciary are in
fact high, the fear of a popular backlash can therefore be expected to
encourage political actors not to use the override power in most cases,
even if they disagree with the merits of a specific judicial ruling.
These considerations do not mean, of course, that a legislature
will never be able to make use of an override power in a nation where
the judiciary holds significant popular support. It always remains
possible, for example, that judges will miscalculate the degree of
138. Whittington, supra note 94, at 464-65 (suggesting that the legislature would
lose much of the value of independent judicial review if an override were frequently
used).
139. Cf. Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?, 69
MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006) (suggesting that a general culture has emerged in Canada
in which political disagreement with judicial interpretations of rights are not
considered "constitutionally appropriate.").
140. See Kahana, Public Discussion, supra note 33, at 268-72 (discussing strong




specific support that exists for a particular ruling or in relation to a
particular issue, and that this action will lead a sufficient proportion
of the population to support action overriding the court's decision.'
Over the longer term, the judiciary might also find that its levels of
diffuse support are damaged if it renders too many rulings that
conflict with prevailing popular views, in which case the public may
come to support more frequent uses of the override.'42 On the whole,
however, provided a national judiciary retains high levels of popular
support amongst its public, we would not expect to see regular use of
any override power by that nation's legislative branch. Conversely,
this also does not mean that we would expect to see judges freely
imposing their own preferences when deciding rights-based cases,
given the way in which popular opinion also constrains judicial action,
What it does mean is that when judges speak out in a way that
conflicts with political branch preferences, we are unlikely to see
frequent political responses using an override mechanism.
In combination, this analysis indicates that although the
legislative override mechanism is unique in the way in which it
enables an ordinary legislative majority to directly set aside judicial
rulings, it is far from unique in the impact it is likely to have on the
strategic dynamics of judicial review. While the override power is
formally easier to employ than the blunt tools of response common in
strong-form systems of judicial review, the fact that repeated uses of
an override can similarly harm the institutional integrity of the
judiciary is likely to encourage political actors not to make frequent
use of this mechanism. In most constitutional systems, we can also
expect that some combination of structural features of the system and
other strategic incentives is likely to prevent or forestall political
actors from making regular use of an override, just as these factors
will inhibit political actors in strong-form systems from making
regular use of blunt sanctioning tools. As a result, and perhaps
somewhat surprisingly given the way in which the legislative override
model has been praised for pioneering a third model of
constitutionalism, we can expect to find little difference in the general
form of inter-branch interactions in both strong-form and legislative
141. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Troy Riddell, The Changing Nature of Public
Support for the Supreme Court of Canada, 37 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 23, 43 (2004)
("[Public] opposition might.., make it difficult for the Court to legitimize the policy
choices it makes. This latter consequence ... might make judicial decisions more
susceptible to the use of the Charter's 'notwithstanding' clause.").
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override systems of judicial review. To the extent that there are
differences in judicial-legislative interactions in such systems, this will
stem from the specific structural and strategic forces present that
motivate political branch respect for judicial rulings, rather than from
the mechanisms of legislative response that have been adopted.
2. The Declaration of Incompatibility Model
The claim that similar forms of interaction between the branches
are likely in both strong-form and legislative override systems of
judicial review can largely be explained by the parallel structure of
those two models of judicial review: namely, both systems empower
judges to strike down legislation, but simply have different
mechanisms available to the political branches to respond to judicial
rulings in the event of disagreement. The declaration of
incompatibility model, in contrast, operates in a more distinctive way.
Rather than allowing judges to invalidate legislation and then
providing legislatures with an ex post method of negating judicial
decisions, it instead places an ex ante restriction on judicial action by
limiting judges to the issuance of purely hortatory statements about
the impact of legislative measures on rights.'
On first appearances, it might be thought that strategically
minded judges would take advantage of a declaration of
incompatibility power to declare more frequently that challenged
legislation is incompatible with protected rights than in systems where
doing so would require them to invalidate the legislation in question.
Striking down legislation, after all, has the potential to place the court
in direct confrontation with the political branches due to the force of
the court's intervention in the policy process. Merely announcing an
incompatibility between legislation and protected rights, on the other
hand, does not place the legislature's policy choices at the same
degree of risk because the legislature can simply ignore the court's
ruling in the event of disagreement. The act of issuing a declaration
of incompatibility would therefore seem to provide the judiciary with
greater protection from subsequent political attack than if judges had
the power to invalidate legislative choices.
This is not a complete answer, however, as we must also account
for the fact that judges are unlikely to issue frequent declarations of
incompatibility if they calculate that these declarations will be
143. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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ignored or not implemented by the political branches. In this regard,
the strategic calculations that judges can be expected to make are
similar, but not identical, to those of judges who are concerned to
ensure that their binding rulings are not overcome by political actors.
At the most basic level, judges want their decisions to be effective and
can therefore be expected to avoid courses of action that are unlikely
to achieve this goal."' In addition, the continued institutional
authority of the judiciary and the future significance of its decisions
may be at risk if the political branches consistently ignore
declarations of incompatibility over the long term.'45 This damage is
unlikely to occur as rapidly as if regular ex post sanctions were placed
on courts because mere inaction sends a more subtle message about
the institutional position of the judiciary than overt sanctioning
action. Nonetheless, over the longer term repeated failures to act
may have a similar effect because they send a strong signal that
judicial input on questions of rights is not considered as valuable or
influential as legislative determinations, thereby exposing the
judiciary's relative weakness as an institution.'46
The possibility that the political branches will fail to act on
judicial declarations is quite real because of the way in which the
unique power-distributing structure of the declaration of
incompatibility model shifts the burden of legislative inertia.' In
systems in which judges have the power to strike down legislation,
those who want to overcome an invalidation bear the burden of
144. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 127 (1996) (observing that the "Court is aware that its rulings can be
difficult to enforce and may be ignored" which "can influence the willingness of the
Court to take on certain cases and may limit the remedies the Court applies in cases
it does decide").
145. See, e.g., Poole, supra note 72, at 202 ("One (unintentional) effect of granting
judges power short of constitutional review may be to reduce their bargaining
strength - at least when compared to their colleagues who operate within more
orthodox legal constitutional frameworks - the effect of which may be to make
judges less inclined to speak up (or speak up so forthrightly).").
146. VANBERG, supra note 14, at 27 ("A successful evasion of a ruling is costly for
the court as an institution because it undermines the court's authority by challenging
its role in the policymaking process and demonstrates its relative weakness."); Cross
& Nelson, supra note 87, at 1470 ("[F]ailure to implement drains the court's policy
decision of meaning, may eliminate any policy benefit that the court hoped to
achieve, and may incidentally undermine the future significance of judicial decisions.
As such, it removes the incentive for courts to act contrary to the interests of other
branches.").
147. See generally Perry, supra note 4, at 670-71; ROACH, SUPREME COURT ON
TRIAL, supra note 9, at 63.
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legislative inertia because the judicial ruling stands unless or until the
necessary majority takes action in response. In a declaration of
incompatibility system, in contrast, those who want action to be taken
removing the incompatibility identified by the court bear the burden
of legislative inertia. In this situation, the legislature itself is the
beneficiary of the inertia because its original measures stand unless or
until it decides to take remedial action." In the event that the sitting
legislature has the same policy preferences as the enacting legislature,
the incentives motivating legislative action would therefore need to
be incredibly weighty to overcome the benefits of this inertia.149 In
addition, if there are structural features of the constitutional system
that promote political gridlock, this will make it more difficult for the
legislature to act even if a majority is convinced that remedial action
should be taken.
The incentives that might motivate political actors to take
remedial action in a declaration of incompatibility system are likely to
be much the same as those found in other systems of judicial review.
As we have already seen, there are a variety of nationally specific
reasons why legislators might place value on a strong and
independent judiciary. If any of these incentives, or a combination
thereof, carried particularly strong weight in a specific national
context, they could be expected to prompt remedial measures
following a judicial declaration in order to preserve the judiciary's
authority as an institution and ensure the future significance of its
rulings.
In stark contrast to other models of judicial review, however, it is
unlikely that public support for the judiciary would operate as such a
powerful incentive for legislative action following a judicial
declaration of incompatibility. If levels of popular support for the
judiciary in a particular nation are high, then the public will expect
the political branches to take action implementing judicial
declarations. Even if this is true, however, it would be relatively easy
for political actors in a declaration of incompatibility system to hide
failures to take remedial action from the public."5° For example, if the
public expected compliance with a judicial declaration in a particular
148. See Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, supra note 30, at
250-51.
149. See Epstein, Knight & Martin, supra note 96.
150. Vanberg, supra note 112, at 347 ("Voters must be able to monitor legislative
responses to judicial rulings effectively and reliably.").
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case and pushed hard for an appropriate response, the legislature
might announce its intention to amend the law in question in line with
judicial views. The legislature would nevertheless retain significant
leeway to back out of this commitment due to the time it takes for
measures to pass through the legislative process."' As time continues
to pass, issues can simply fade from the public radar and the public
may be unaware that remedial action is never taken. Public concern
about the issue may also simply fade with the passage of time.
Even if the public and the media continue to monitor the
legislature, elected representatives may still be able to evade
compliance. In this regard, even if legislative actors were to amend a
statute or enact new legislation following a judicial declaration, they
would retain significant discretion to change the law in a way that
appears to implement the judiciary's preferences but which actually
avoids the full implications of the ruling.'52 While the public might
become aware of such evasion, this is less likely to happen if the
judicial declaration concerns a highly technical area of the law or
relates to issues of relatively low political salience.'53
While this analysis paints a clear picture of expected judicial and
legislative behavior in relation to the declaration of incompatibility
mechanism itself, the strong interpretive provisions that are
commonly found in this weak-form model are also likely to influence
strategic dynamics between the branches.' Although there will be
limits to how far judges can go in "interpreting" legislation, strong
interpretive provisions provide strategically minded judges with an
alternative and more effective way of achieving their preferences than
by issuing a declaration of incompatibility.'55 Of critical importance
from a strategic perspective, if judges are able to implement their own
151. It would make little difference if a "fast track" procedure, such as that found
under the HRA, were in place because there is no requirement that such a process
must be used. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. Vanberg, supra note 112, at 347 ("[A] legislative collation may choose to
comply procedurally (it does not revise the statute) but not substantively (the
particular revision chosen still maintains the essence of the offending provision.").
153. VANBERG, supra note 14, at 22 ("On issues that have low saliency, evasion is
a much safer alternative than on issues that voters are intensely aware of.").
154. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
155. See Poole, supra note 72, at 202 (suggesting that an "unintended side-effect"
of the declaration of incompatibility model is that it encourages judges to "interpret
their way to results rather than referring them back to the legislature for a final
decision."). The extent of judicial discretion is likely to depend on the specific
wording of the provision that is adopted.
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preferences about the meaning and interpretation of rights by
interpreting legislation so that it is compatible with protected rights,
this will ensure that their preferences remain legally effective unless
or until the legislature amends the statute or takes other remedial
action. By reversing the effects of legislative inertia, the judiciary is
thus more likely to see its preferences stand over the longer term,
subject, of course, to the ever present risk of popular backlash.56
The legislature would also face special difficulties if the court
concluded that statutory language would violate protected rights
unless interpreted in a particular way.57 In these circumstances, the
only way the legislature could pursue its own understanding of the
rights in question would be to re-enact the offending statute making
clear that it meant what it said the first time. Over time, this action
can be expected to be subject to further judicial interpretation. While
the court might respond by reconsidering its initial interpretation of
the right, it could also interpret the legislation in the same way it
originally did. If this occurred, the legislature would be left with little
practical option other than to modify the statute in accordance with
the court's interpretation of protected rights.
Taking these various considerations into account, this analysis
indicates that we can expect to see rather different strategic moves by
judges and legislators in declaration of incompatibility systems as
compared to both legislative override and strong-form systems of
judicial review, which can be attributed to the unique power-
distributing mechanism central to the declaration of incompatibility
model. On the one hand, we would expect to find judges in a
declaration of incompatibility system preferring to use their
interpretive powers whenever possible, rather than to issue
declarations that may never become legally effective. In
circumstances where this option is not workable, however, judges are
likely to have much less discretion to pursue their own
understandings of rights than under either the legislative override or
strong-form models of judicial review, and can thus be expected to
engage in anticipated reactions to avoid declarations of
incompatibility whenever possible. This result is attributable both to
156. See, e.g., Klug, Judicial Deference, supra note 66, at 130 ("The danger of
proceeding through 'the backdoor' [with section 3] is a backlash which could halt
further progress.").




the hortatory nature of declarations of incompatibility which shifts
the burden of legislative inertia, and to the fact that public support for
the judiciary is unlikely to be such a strong motivating force for
political branch remedial action under this model. Only if other
incentives are sufficiently powerful to motivate legislative actors to
overcome their inertia, and the structural features of the political
system are such that gridlock is uncommon, would we expect these
dynamics to change.
IV. Canadian and United Kingdom Experience with
Weak-form Models of Judicial Review
Given that positive theory is a form of predictive theory, it
remains to be explored whether this account does, in fact, successfully
explain the behavior of judges and legislatures under the leading
weak-form bills of rights models. In order to do so, this Part returns
to the Canadian and British experience with their respective charters
of rights to assess how well experience in those nations fits with
positive predictions. As we will see, the available evidence strongly
supports positive expectations about judicial and legislative behavior
under both the legislative override system and the declaration of
incompatibility models.
A. Canadian Experience with the Legislative Override Model
As discussed in Part II, despite the hopes of many constitutional
theorists, the legislative override contained in section 33 of the
Canadian Charter has rarely been used by legislatures in Canada to
respond to judicial decisions about the meaning and interpretation of
rights. It is possible that this result could be attributed to successful
anticipated reactions by the judiciary, based on the desire to avoid
confrontations with the political branches. This is not a complete
explanation, however, because it does not account for why the
override is so infrequently used even when the political branches
disagree with individual judicial rulings.158  Consistent with the
positive account of the legislative override model outlined in the
previous Part, it instead appears that there are a variety of
158. See Christine Bateup, Expanding the Conversation: American and Canadian
Experiences of Constitutional Dialogue in Comparative Perspective, 21 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 1, 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter Bateup, Expanding the Conversation]
(discussing the few instances in which section 33 has been used to respond to judicial
decisions).
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impediments to effective political action in Canada that prevent
legislatures from regularly resorting to the override, even in the event
of strong disagreement with specific judicial decisions. The force of
these impediments is diminished in certain provinces, however, which
also explains why the only uses of the section 33 override to respond
to judicial rulings have taken place in Quebec.
Turning first to possible structural barriers to effective political
action, the nature of parliamentary government in Canada is such
that there does not appear to be a significant amount of political
gridlock in that nation at either the federal or provincial levels. At
the federal level, Canada has a parliamentary system of government
with strong party discipline, which forestalls serious challenges to
government-sponsored legislation as it passes through the legislative
process.159 Although there is a bicameral system of Parliament and
the Senate has a formal veto power over government bills, in practice
the Senate rarely rejects bills that have been passed by the directly
elected House of Commons. This stems from the fact that Senators
are appointed by the Prime Minister, rather than elected directly by
the people.1 6 Furthermore, unlike in many nations where
parliamentary committees have great influence over legislative
measures implicating rights, there is no federal parliamentary
committee in Canada that is charged with examining whether use of
the legislative override is appropriate or desirable in individual
Charter cases.161  Provincial legislatures similarly conform to the
parliamentary model, with a common tradition of strong party
discipline. In addition, and in contrast to the federal bicameral
system, legislatures in the provinces are all unicameral."' Taking
these federal and provincial features of government into account, this
suggests that structural barriers to political action are much less likely
in Canada than they are in many other nations. 6'
159. See generally MICHEL ROSSIGNOL, CROSSING THE FLOOR AND THE PARTY
SYSTEM 8, 13 (1987); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES
AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1989).
160. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), § 24.
161. See, e.g., Hiebert, supra note 139, at 12-13; JAMES B. KELLY, GOVERNING
WITH THE CHARTER: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND FRAMERS' INTENT
245-55 (University of British Columbia Press 2006).
162. See generally LIPSET, supra note 159.
163. Id.
164. Cf. Tushnet, Judicial Activism or Restraint, supra note 135, at 97 (suggesting
that there remain notable structural barriers to political action in the Canadian
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In contrast to the minimal structural barriers to effective political
action in Canada, there do appear to be a variety of powerful
strategic incentives motivating political respect for judicial rulings in
that nation. The first and most powerful strategic incentive is high
levels of public support for the judiciary. While research in this area
remains rather underdeveloped,16" the available social science
evidence indicates that diffuse support for the Supreme Court of
Canada has remained at consistently high levels over the last two
decades.'66 Clear majorities of Canadians also report that they are
comfortable with the courts having the final say about whether a law
violates the Charter and that they are satisfied with the way the
Supreme Court has been doing its job.167
The nature of the connection between specific and diffuse
support for the judiciary in Canada also appears to be consistent with
studies undertaken in other nations.' 6 On the one hand, the Supreme
Court of Canada has a sizable reservoir of support amongst its public
and this support is not easily lost in the face of individual decisions
that run counter to popular attitudes. Nonetheless, studies have also
shown that "[t]he cumulative effect of consistent disagreement with
Court rulings is markedly greater than the impact of single decisions
in isolation."'69 Thus, if the Court were to hand down a series of
salient rulings over time with which a significant proportion of the
public disagreed, the data indicates that this is likely to lead to a
discernable drop in levels of diffuse support for the judiciary.'
parliamentary system).
165. See Hausegger & Riddell, supra note 142, at 27-31.
166. See Joseph F. Fletcher & Paul Howe, Canadian Attitudes toward the Charter
and the Courts in Comparative Perspective, 6 CHOICES, May 2000, at 16 [hereinafter
Fletcher & Howe, Canadian Attitudes]; Andrew Parkin, The Charter and Judicial
Activism: An Analysis of Public Opinion, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 361 (2002)
(discussing the results of a public opinion study undertaken in 2002).
167. See Parkin, supra note 166, at 369 (referring to studies indicating that roughly
70 percent of Canadians prefer that the courts have the final say when a law conflicts
with the Charter, while less than 25 percent favor the legislature having this role);
Fletcher & Howe, Canadian Attitudes, supra note 166, at 11-12 (referring to polling
data indicating that 60 percent of Canadians preferred the Court, rather than the
legislature, having the final say).
168. See Joseph F. Fletcher & Paul Howe, Supreme Court Cases and Court
Support: The State of Canadian Public Opinion, CHOICES, May 2000.
169. Id. at 52.
170. Id.; See also Hausegger & Riddell, supra note 142 (finding some support for
the hypothesis that the connection between specific and diffuse support has increased
as the Court has become more polarized).
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This evidence demonstrating high levels of support for the
Supreme Court amongst the Canadian populace supports the
proposition that Canadian legislatures are generally motivated not to
use their override powers because doing so would lead to a significant
risk of electoral backlash. Legislative majorities are also likely to be
"caught" by the public when contemplating use of the override power
because discussions about this issue tend to receive considerable
media attention in Canada, at least in relation to high salience cases."'
Indeed, on the rare occasions when Canadian legislatures have used,
or have considered using, the section 33 override following a Supreme
Court ruling, a significant popular outcry has followed, indicating
high levels of public awareness of legislative proposals for action. It is
likely that some of this negative public reaction stems from popular
agreement with the position that the Court has taken.'72 Nonetheless,
even when there has been notable popular opposition to a specific
ruling, the judiciary appears to have been protected by the strong
levels of diffuse support that it holds.
17 3
Although popular support thus appears to be a powerful
incentive motivating Canadian legislators not to use their override
powers, this analysis requires some additional refinement in relation
to the provinces. As observed previously, the only circumstances in
which use of the section 33 override has been seriously contemplated
have involved provincial legislatures." Furthermore, the only
province to have successfully utilized the override to respond to
judicial rulings is Quebec.7 1 Closer examination reveals, however,
that greater preparedness to use the legislative override in specific
171. See, e.g., Bateup, Expanding the Conversation, supra note 158, at 44-45
(discussing media attention to, and public discussion of, the Alberta government's
proposal to use the override in response to Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.R. 493
(Can.)).
172. This is true, for example, in relation to the Alberta legislature's failed attempt
to override Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.R. 493 (Can.). See generally id. at 43-44.
173. See, e.g., R.J.R.-MacDonald v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.)
(invalidating federal legislation that banned tobacco advertising on freedom of the
press grounds). Although this decision was very unpopular, potential use of the
override was ultimately more unpopular than the ruling itself. See Leeson, supra
note 17, at 320; JANET L. HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS PARLIAMENT'S
ROLE? ch. 4 (2002).
174. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
175. The Alberta government preemptively invoked the override clause in 2000 in
an attempt to preserve the opposite sex definition of marriage. This was ineffective,
however, as provincial governments do not have the power to define marriage in
Canada. See Bateup, Expanding the Conversation, supra note 158, at 49.
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provinces is consistent with positive expectations because the
judiciary does not appear to receive the same level of protection from
public support in some provinces as in other parts of the nation.
Beginning with Quebec, the available evidence indicates that
overall satisfaction with the Supreme Court is fairly high in that
province, though slightly lower than in the rest of Canada.176 Polling
data nevertheless indicates that Quebecers are manifestly more open
to the idea of doing away with the Supreme Court completely if it
began to consistently make decisions that ran counter to dominant
popular opinion.' A majority of Quebecers also support reducing
the power of the Court to decide controversial issues, in contrast to
other Canadians who are relatively content with the Court playing
this role."' Levels of diffuse support for the judiciary thus appear to
be discernibly lower in Quebec than in the rest of Canada.
These dynamics regarding popular support are replicated
amongst other Canadians with strong provincial attachments. This is
most apparent in the Western provinces, such as Alberta, where
citizens frequently express discontent that they do not have a greater
say in national affairs. 9 While overall satisfaction with the Court
remains significant for those with strong provincial attachments, these
attachments do make a significant difference to other levels of
support for the Court. For example, studies suggest that 64 percent of
such people agree that the Court's power to decide controversial
cases should be reduced, and the same percentage agree that it might
be best to do away with the Court altogether if it started to make a
large number of decisions with which people disagreed."n
These statistics concerning popular support are not specific to
the Court's role in Charter cases, but concern its constitutional role
more generally. It is therefore possible that lower levels of diffuse
176. Fletcher & Howe, Canadian Attitudes, supra note 166, at 16 (reporting that
69% of Quebecers express satisfaction with the Supreme Court, compared to 79% of
respondents in the rest of Canada).
177. Id. at 17, 19 (showing that while only 36 percent of Canadians agreed with
this proposition, 52.5 percent of Quebecers were open to doing away with the Court
if it began to consistently make decisions with which people disagreed).
178. Id. at 17-18 (51 percent in favor and 33 percent against).
179. For a recent discussion, see ROGER GIBBINS & LOLEEN BERDAHL, WESTERN
VISIONS, WESTERN FUTURES: PERSPECrIVES ON THE WEST IN CANADA (Broadview
Press 2d ed. 2003) (arguing that Western Canadians feel alienated from the rest of
Canada, including the federal government, and are concerned that their political
goals are not shared by the rest of the country).
180. Id.
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support for the Court amongst Quebecers and other Canadians with
strong provincial attachments are connected to the judiciary's
contentious role in federalism cases.' At the very least, however, the
available evidence is consistent with the proposition that Quebecers
and others with strong provincial attachments may be more likely to
support provincial use of the override in circumstances where the
Court acts against dominant public opinion in their province. If this is
true, we would expect these dynamics to motivate the Court to avoid
frequent invalidations in relation to issues likely to provoke
significant provincial controversy.
This expectation has in fact been borne out in practice, with the
Supreme Court only rarely invalidating legislation in core areas of
provincial responsibility.1 2 In particular, minority language and
education rights cases, which have generated significant public
controversy in Quebec - and other provinces - since the Charter's
enactment, have resulted in the invalidation of legislation on only
four occasions.183 While firm conclusions are difficult to draw, this
anecdotal evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that
strategic dynamics between courts and legislatures operate slightly
differently in provinces such as Quebec than in the rest of Canada.
Consideration of the provincial situation also reveals an
additional incentive that appears likely to motivate the federal
government in Canada to respect Supreme Court Charter rulings
even in the event of significant disagreement. Specifically, the federal
government has a powerful incentive not to undermine the long term
significance of constitutional review by making frequent use of the
override because it relies on the Supreme Court as a partner in
maintaining the Canadian federation.1" Although the threat of
secession has subsided somewhat in recent years, Quebec nationalism
remains an ever present force in Canadian politics.' If secessionist
181. See id. at 20 ("Federal authority and the Supreme Court's role in division of
powers and reference cases are contentious issues in Quebec. Many Quebecers likely
oppose the Supreme Court not because it sometimes strikes down legislation passed
by elected bodies, but because they reject federal authority.").
182. See Kelly, supra note 161, at 147.
183. See Que. Ass'n of Protestant Sch. Bds. v. Que. (Att'y Gen.), [1984] 2 S.C.R.
66 (Can.); Mahe v. Alta., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 (Can.); Reference re Pub. Schs. Act
(Man.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839 (Can.); Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island,
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
184. See Bateup, Expanding the Conversation, supra note 158, at 33-39.
185. PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A
[Vol. 32:2
Dialogic Possibilities
sentiment were to reemerge in Quebec, this might also exacerbate the
push for greater power in the Western provinces. 1 6 It is thus clearly
in the federal government's strategic interests to foster a strong
federal judiciary that can assist it in consolidating the supremacy of
the Canadian Constitution and ensuring the maintenance of the
present federal structure. Safeguarding the judiciary's institutional
authority by avoiding the legislative override also enables the federal
government to shift responsibility for controversial policy goals to
judges when this might provoke a provincial backlash."n
While care must be taken in drawing firm conclusions from
limited empirical data, the available evidence strongly supports
positive expectations about judicial and legislative behavior under the
legislative override system in Canada. Despite the dominant
narrative that historical circumstance alone explains the desuetude of
the Canadian override, it instead appears likely that a combination of
strategic incentives motivating political respect for judicial rulings in
Canada is also at play. Of primary importance, popular support for
the judiciary operates as a powerful incentive, particularly outside
Quebec and the Western provinces. The federal government also has
an important interest in sustaining a powerful federal judiciary to
support its institutional position vis-A-vis the provinces. Particularly
at the federal level, these incentives thus explain why we do not see
frequent resort to the override, even in the event of significant
political disagreement with individual judicial rulings. This does not
mean, however, that judicial freedom of action is unlimited due to the
way in which popular opinion also operates as a notable constraint on
judicial action."" Indeed, if the Canadian judiciary were to render too
many Charter rulings that conflict with prevailing popular opinion,
particularly in relation to controversial social issues, the public may
come to support more frequent use of the override power.'89
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the effects of Quebec nationalism on
Canadian federal politics).
186. See Gibbins & Berdahl,supra note 179.
187. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 39-40 (2004) (describing
this situation as one in which the political branches might profit from an expansion of
judicial power); Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty, supra note 110, at 37 (1993)
(discussing the strong incentive for political leaders to pass controversial issues to the
judiciary for resolution).
188. See generally Bateup, Expanding the Conversation, supra note 158.
189. See Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, Measuring Judicial Activism on the
Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Nape,
48 MCGILL L.J. 525, 543 (2003) (suggesting that positive evidence might indicate that
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Accordingly, and as predicted, the result is a similar form of strategic
dynamics to what we might expect to find in a strong-form system of
judicial review."
B. British Experience with the Declaration of
Incompatibility Model
In contrast to Canadian experience, which fits well with positive
predictions, British experience with the HRA appears to raise greater
questions regarding the explanatory force of positive theory."' After
all, contrary to the general predictions made in the previous Part,
judges in the United Kingdom have not been particularly reluctant to
issue declarations of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA.
Furthermore, and also contrary to the expectations outlined in Part
III, the British Parliament has almost universally responded to
judicial declarations of incompatibility by amending or repealing the
statute in question. 9
The previous Part did explain, however, that its general
predictions regarding the declaration of incompatibility model would
not be applicable in all constitutional settings. As a general rule, it
was suggested that the way in which the unique power-distributing
structure of the declaration of incompatibility model shifts the burden
of legislative inertia means that legislatures will be unlikely to
respond to judicial declarations by taking remedial action in most
constitutional systems, particularly if the structure of the
constitutional system promotes political gridlock. Consequently, it
was also suggested that judges can generally be expected to avoid
declarations of incompatibility whenever possible so as to avoid
the override has not been delegitimized in Canada and may come to be used again in
the future if circumstances change).
190. Positive insights also help us to understand the operation of section 1 in the
Canadian context. As discussed previously, weak-form dialogue theorists in Canada
now argue that section 1 is the key provision enabling dialogue between the branches
under the Charter. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. The use of
reasonable limits analysis is better viewed, however, as a form of strategic behavior
by the judiciary. In effect, this action reduces the risk that the override will be
employed by leaving space for less confrontational legislative responses. See Bateup,
Expanding the Conversation, supra note 158, at 40 n.221.
191. There is a notable dearth of social science evidence regarding institutional
behavior and the operation of public support in the United Kingdom. The following
analysis is thus necessarily restricted to consideration of more anecdotal evidence
about judicial and legislative behavior in the British setting.
192. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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damage to their institutional integrity. It was also recognized,
however, that there would be exceptions to these general rules in
certain constitutional settings. In this regard, these general dynamics
would not apply in settings where particularly weighty incentives
existed motivating political branch respect for, and implementation
of, judicial declarations of incompatibility. As we will see, this
exception is in fact the rule in the United Kingdom, where one
particularly powerful and nationally specific incentive appears to
motivate the political branches to take regular remedial action
following judicial declarations.
In order to understand the dynamics of the British system, it is
helpful to begin by taking a closer look at the fourteen cases in which
British courts have rendered declarations of incompatibility and
which have led to parliamentary responses. In two of these cases, the
offending provisions were no longer in force when the declarations of
incompatibility were announced.'9 3  This fact is likely to have
encouraged judicial resort to the declaration of incompatibility
power, as there was simply no risk that these rulings would not be
effective in light of the prior legislative repeals. Issuing declarations
of incompatibility in these cases was also a valuable strategic move in
the early years of the HRA's operation because they provided judges
with a non-controversial context in which to assert their new powers.
In so doing, the judiciary was able to assert itself as a key player in the
new system of rights protection established by the HRA.' 4
Closer examination of the rulings in which declarations of
incompatibility were issued also reveals that eleven of these cases
involved legislation that was in force prior to the enactment of the
HRA.19 ' There are two related reasons why declaratory action in
193. R v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 813, 2003
3 All E.R. 673 (Eng.).; R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 814,
2003 3 All E.R. 719.
194. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES ch.3 (2003) (discussing various
circumstances in which judiciaries exercising new judicial review powers can
strategically cultivate their influence).
195. R v. London North and East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal, [2002]
Q.B. 1 (Mental Health Act, 1983, c.20, § 73); R v. McR, (2002) NIQB 58; R v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners, [2003] EWCA(Civ) 814, 2003 3 All E.R. 719; R v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2002] UKHL 46, 2003 1 A.C. 837; R v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2805, 2003 1 W.L.R.
1315; Blood v. Secretary of State for Health, [2003] EWHC (Admin) (declaration by
consent, unreported); Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] UKHL 21, 2003 2 A.C. 467; R v.
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these cases is not necessarily inconsistent with positive expectations.
First, the fact that judicial declarations were made in relation to older
statutes can be viewed as consistent with the British government's
general intention, when it enacted the HRA, to alter conceptions of
what forms of political action are now legally acceptable. The
passage of the HRA is therefore likely to have sent a signal to British
judges that they should update older statutes to ensure that they
conform to the new rights regime."9 In addition, encouraging the
judiciary to scrutinize and update legislation enacted in an earlier
policy context, rather than leaving this task to Parliament itself, can
be seen as an efficient political strategy given limited parliamentary
time and resources.1" As the years pass, however, and older
legislation is progressively updated, we can expect that the numbers
of declarations of incompatibility rendered in relation to older
statutes will also decline.
The second, and related, reason why the numbers of declarations
of incompatibility that have been issued in relation to older statutes is
not necessarily in conflict with positive expectations is because
judicial action in these cases might have been consistent with the
preferences of the sitting Parliament. Most generally, the fact that
Labour remains in power continues to send a clear signal to the courts
about existing political branch preferences regarding the protection
and enforcement of Convention rights. More specifically, the courts
might also have declared legislation incompatible with protected
rights in particular cases because they formed the view that those laws
did not conform to the substantive preferences of the sitting, as
opposed to the enacting, Parliament.198
While these two factors provide some explanation as to why
Parliament has routinely responded to declarations of incompatibility
with conforming remedial action, they do not, by themselves, provide
Secretary of State for Health, [2003] ACD 389; R v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 813, 2003 3 All E.R. 673; R v. Westminster City
Council, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1184, 2006 1 W.L.R. 505; R v. First Secretary of State,
[2006] EWHC (Admin) (unreported).
196. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 161, at 149 ("[J]udicial activism may be an
irrelevant empirical consideration if the Court simply invalidates statutes enacted in a
pre-rights policy context.").
197. See Segal, supra note 83, at 31 (noting the "transition costs and opportunity
costs to passing legislation").
198. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78
IND. L.J. 123 (2003) (showing that the United States Supreme Court is more likely to
invalidate legislation when an ideologically similar Congress is in power).
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a complete explanation of the dynamics of judicial and legislative
behavior under the HRA. There is because there is an even more
powerful and unique motivating force that appears to operate in the
British setting and in a wider range of cases. This is connected to the
United Kingdom's obligations as a signatory to the European
Convention on Human Rights.
As a matter of international law, the European Convention
became binding on the British government when it came into force on
September 3, 1953.'9 Although no action was taken to give domestic
effect to the rights contained in the Convention until the passage of
the HRA, individuals have been able to bring individual petitions
before the European Court of Human Rights (the "European
Court") since 1966. This right of individual petition remains in force
today provided that all domestic remedies have first been exhausted.
Following the enactment of the HRA, this means that where the
British government and the courts have failed to remedy a violation
of Convention rights - including cases where the judiciary has been
restricted to issuing a declaration of incompatibility and Parliament
has failed to take remedial action - individual litigants can take their
case to the European Court in Strasbourg.' ° Although rulings of the
European Court do not automatically take effect as domestic law, the
British government is treaty-bound to respect the Court's decisions.
The threat of individual petition and the risk that the United
Kingdom would suffer significant political embarrassment if it were to
lose a case before the European Court create real indirect pressure
and a strong incentive for the British government to respond to a
judicial declaration of incompatibility by amending the relevant
legislation in accordance with judicial views. °1 As Michael Perry has
observed, it was in part to avoid such embarrassment that the British
Parliament adopted the HRA in the first place, as the United
Kingdom had already lost a number of high profile rights cases before
the European Court.2' Specifically, it was thought that if British
199. See WADHAM & MOUNTFORD, supra note 52, at ch.2.
200. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
201. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective:
Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 NYU L. REV. 19 (2001); Perry, supra
note 4, at 670-71; Adrienne Stone, The Australian Free Speech Experiment and
Scepticism about the UK Human Rights Act, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 409.
202. Perry, supra note 4, at 671.
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courts could protect Convention rights at the domestic level, this
would both lessen the number of cases in which the United Kingdom
was brought before the European Court and would also mean that
the government would be less likely to lose cases in Strasbourg. 3
In circumstances where the European Court has already ruled
that certain kinds of legislative measures conflict with Convention
rights, British courts are in the strongest strategic position to render
declarations of incompatibility in relation to similar national
measures. Indeed, on a number of occasions when British courts
have issued declarations that legislation is incompatible with
Convention rights, they have been acting to give domestic effect to
the existing jurisprudence of the European Court.' 4 Even in cases
where the European Court has not yet ruled, the continuing
possibility of individual petition to that Court is likely to act as a very
strong incentive for the political branches to respond to a judicial
declaration with genuine remedial legislation. The fact that there are
few conditions for political gridlock in the United Kingdom, with a
parliamentary system of government with strong party discipline and
an appointed upper chamber, also ensures that the government is
generally able to guarantee the passage of remedial legislation
through Parliament, even if individual parliamentarians disagree with
this course of action.' Knowledge of these factors is likely to lead to
more frequent declarations of incompatibility being issued by judges,
even when judicial preferences are inconsistent with the preferences
of the sitting Parliament. It also means that British courts can more
confidently use their interpretive powers under section 3 of the HRA
203. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS, HANSARD, Feb. 16, 1997, col.780 (Jack Straw).
204. For example, in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002]
UKHL 46, 2003 1 A.C. 837, the House of Lords issued a declaration of
incompatibility on the ground that a power conferred on the Home Secretary by
section 29 of the Crime (Sentencing) Act 1997 to control the release of mandatory
life sentence prisoners was inconsistent with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of
the European Convention. Two recent decisions of the European Court had already
come to similar conclusions. See Stafford v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1121
(2002); Benjamin v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002). Similarly, in
Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] UKHL 21, 2003 2 A.C. 467, the House of Lords made a
declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act that statutory
provisions preventing a transsexual from marrying were incompatible with Articles 8
and 12 of the Convention. One year earlier, the European Court had already
announced that United Kingdom law in this area was incompatible with these
Convention rights. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 EUR. Cr. H.R. 447 (2002).




to read legislation compatibly with Convention rights, even if this
conflicts with legislative intention.
This analysis does not mean that British judges are completely
free to pursue their own preferences when the possibility exists of an
appeal to the European Court. Of principal importance, and similar
to other systems of judicial review, the British judiciary is likely to be
constrained by popular opinion when making decisional choices."
The force of popular opinion as a constraint on judicial behavior is
currently quite difficult to test in the British context, given the dearth
of social science scholarship addressing this question. Nevertheless,
studies that have been undertaken in other nations have shown that,
as a general rule, the age of judicial institutions tends to correlate
with high levels of popular support because "to know something
about courts is to be favorably oriented toward them."2°7 Similarly,
these studies also suggest that the degree of connection between
specific and diffuse support is also contingent on the age of the
judicial institution.' Even taking this consideration into account,
however, judges in the United Kingdom retain significant power to
pursue their own preferences under the HRA due to the operation of
the European incentive.
Although this account of the strategic dynamics between British
judges and legislators does conform with positive expectations, it
nonetheless represents an exception to how the declaration of
incompatibility model has been predicted to operate in most national
contexts. Although there are a very small number of declaration of
incompatibility systems now in operation in other jurisdictions, those
systems are presently too new to provide any helpful information' 9
As a result, it remains for another time to consider whether these
more general predictions are valid. The positive analysis that has
been undertaken in this Article nevertheless fits with the actual
behavior of judges and legislators in the nations that have been
examined better than any other theory that has presently been
proposed. We should therefore be confident that the predictions that
have been made offer valuable insight into judicial-legislative
dynamics across the different models of judicial review.
206. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
207. Gibson et al., supra note 113, at 344.
208. Id. at 356.
209. See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006, (Vict.); Human
Rights Act, 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
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V. Refraning the Concept of Dialogue
The positive analysis undertaken in Parts III and IV has yielded
some interesting and possibly unexpected conclusions about the kind
of behavior we can expect of judges and legislators under the leading
weak-form bills of rights models. First and most generally, positive
theory indicates that judges and legislatures will act strategically in
their interactions with each other regardless of the form that a
particular national bill of rights takes. While strategic judicial and
legislative behavior is likely to be a universal feature of constitutional
systems, Parts III and IV also demonstrated that the form of rights-
based judicial review that a particular nation has adopted can have a
significant impact on the strategic interplay between the branches.
Contrary to what we might initially expect, the most important factor
in this regard is not the distinction between strong-form and weak-
form models of judicial review. It instead relates to whether judges
are granted the power to strike down legislation, or whether they are
restricted to purely hortatory statements that legislation is
incompatible with protected rights.
It is clear that these positive claims pose a fatal challenge to
weak-form dialogue theory because they starkly reveal the flaws
inherent in that theory's normative behavioral assumptions. This
does not mean, however, that the concept of "dialogue" should be
entirely discarded. Dialogue in fact remains a highly useful
theoretical concept, provided we understand that weak-form dialogue
theorists have simply been looking for dialogue in the wrong place.
Rather than understanding dialogue as a limited form of institutional
interaction between judges and legislatures that is facilitated by the
adoption of weak-form instruments and requires the branches to
adopt a specific normative posture to each other's rights-based
contributions, this Part instead proposes that dialogue is best
understood as a more general and wide-ranging feature of the
strategic relationship between the judiciary and other actors. On this
understanding, both strong-form and weak-form systems can be
expected to generate similar forms of society-wide dialogue between
the judiciary, the political branches and the people about the meaning
and interpretation of rights. Certain judicial review forms can
nonetheless be favored over others due to the way in which they
enhance the potential for more productive society-wide discussion.
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A. The Concept of Society-Wide Dialogue
The theory of constitutional dialogue as a society-wide practice
was first proposed by American scholars as a way of explaining the
nature and function of judicial review in the United States. 2'0 Their
aim in so doing was to articulate a descriptive theory of judicial
review that takes constitutional politics seriously and more accurately
reflects how judges, particularly Supreme Court Justices, behave than
conventional normative scholarship.' Consistent with these goals,
the theory of society-wide dialogue draws on positive insights to
highlight the mutual interdependencies between different
constitutional actors and the way in which institutional and political
constraints impact on constitutional judging.12
Recognizing that judicial review involves the exercise of
interdependent power, this account of dialogue starts from the
premise that judicial decisions are not necessarily the final word on
the constitutional issues being considered in a case. 3 Judicial review
nevertheless plays an extremely important function in the
constitutional system because judicial decisions spark (or continue) a
broader societal discussion between the judiciary, the political
branches, and the people about constitutional meaning and the
particular rights and values at stake in specific cases.2 1' Although
210. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being
Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004)
[hereinafter Friedman, Positive]; Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2003). For a slightly different
positive account of dialogue, which focuses more on inter-branch forms of interaction
in the United States context see NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
(1996); NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004);
FISHER, supra note 91.
211. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory:
A Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 331
(2002) ("Theories of judicial review that take constitutional politics seriously explain
whether judicial practice over the past 200 years can be justified, not whether some
hypothetical judicial practice satisfies the appropriate normative standards.").
212. See, e.g., Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 210, at 653 (explaining that the word
'dialogue' "emphasizes that judicial review is significantly more interdependent and
interactive than generally described.").
213. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84
VA. L. REV. 83, 91 (1998) (recognizing that judicial decisions are not final; "at best,
[they] momentarily resolve the dispute before the Court").
214. See Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 210, at 654 ("The Court may offer an
interpretation that is operative for a time, but the Court's opinions lead debate on a
path that ultimately changes that interpretation."); Post, supra note 210, at 76
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discussion about these issues may already be taking place within
society without judicial prompting, judicial decisions about
controversial issues that are framed in constitutional terms can help
to actively channel, maintain and focus the terms of that debate
within both the political branches and the populace.2" The fact that
judges speak in this way may also serve to enhance broader public
consideration of particular controversies by "increasing popular
awareness of certain fundamental issues."26 Judicial decisions can
then set off a process of further debate, either by acting as a catalyst
for discussion along particular lines or prodding other institutions into
deliberative action.
The judiciary's participation in society-wide dialogue is not
limited, however, to sparking a process of national conversation. The
dynamic and interactive nature of dialogue also means that judges are
affected and shaped by the conversation that takes place due to the
possibility of popular disagreement motivating disciplinary action by
the political branches.2 7 It is for this reason that public opinion
operates as such a strong driving force for the process of society-wide
dialogue.1 8 When a controversial judicial ruling is handed down, this
tends to prompt discussion and debate about the merits of that
decision within society. Frequently, much of this reaction is critical,
allowing those who disagree with the ruling to come together in
opposition. 9 Over time, the discussion may lead to shifts in popular
attitudes towards the position that the Court has expressed.
Alternatively, if the Court has misjudged the amount of popular
disagreement that exists in relation to a specific issue, the ongoing
(conceiving of the judicial development of constitutional law as "a dialogue with the
constitutional culture of the nation").
215. See Friedman, Positive, supra note 210, at 1295-96 ("Prompting, maintaining
and focusing this debate about constitutional meaning is the primary function of
judicial review.").
216. Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 373,403
(2000).
217. See Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 210, at 679 ("[This] dynamic tension [is
what] moves the system of constitutional interpretation along.").
218. See Friedman, Positive, supra note 210, at 1294-95 (identifying popular
opinion as one of the principal driving forces of constitutional dialogue); Friedman,
Politics, supra note 81, at 334 (arguing that the system of judicial review in the United
States is "dialogic and self-enforcing" because it "creates continual exchange
between constitutional meaning and popular opinion, though systematically and at a
remove").
219. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 127 (describing the enormous white "backlash"
against Brown, which united those opposed to the decision).
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debate may lead to a solidifying of popular opinion at odds with the
Court's ruling and encourage the political branches to reach into their
bag of tools to bring the judiciary back into line. As a result of this
dissent, the judiciary may, over the longer term, come to reconsider
and reshape its decisions in particular areas, with the perspectives of
non-judicial actors as much, if not more, of an influence on judges
than the other way around. 220 As these dynamics play out over the
long term, a relatively stable and enduring equilibrium about
constitutional meaning will result that is broadly accepted by the
various participants in the national conversation.22'
This description of dialogue as a society-wide practice provides a
rather different vision of dialogue than that proposed by weak-form
theorists. As we have seen, weak-form dialogue theory tends to be
largely prescriptive, positing ideal forms of judicial and legislative
behavior that are necessary for weak-form dialogue to be realized in
practice.22 Weak-form dialogue theorists also propose a strictly inter-
branch account of dialogue that concentrates solely on interactions
between courts and the political branches of government. The theory
of society-wide dialogue is, in contrast, a heavily descriptive - or
positive - account of dialogue that is firmly grounded in the social
science evidence examined in Parts III and IV regarding how judicial
review actually operates. On this understanding, dialogue is not just
some normative ideal to be pursued, but a richer description of actual
practices that stem from the broader institutional environment in
which judges operate. Of equal importance, and as a consequence of
this positive focus, this alternative vision of dialogue does not focus
narrowly on inter-branch relations in the context of individual cases,
but on broader forms of society-wide conversation between the
judiciary, the political branches and the populace that take place
220. As Friedman states, the fact that there is some slack between the Supreme
Court and popular views means that the Court is not immediately responsive to
popular opinion, but instead to "a body of opinion that endures over time."
Friedman, Positive, supra note 210, at 1297. This ensures that constitutional change
will occur only after an intense national debate about an issue has taken place.
221. See Post, supra note 210, at 108 (arguing that a "relatively stable equilibrium"
develops over time "in which the beliefs and values of the nation ... will roughly
correspond to the constitutional standards . . . enforced by the Court"); Barry R.
Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 245, 245 (1997) (suggesting that "democratic stability depends on a self-
enforcing equilibrium" and that "it must be in the interests of political officials to
respect democracy's limits on their behavior").
222. See supra Part II.
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223about the meaning of fundamental values over the longer term. In
so doing, the theory thus recognizes the central role of public support
for the judiciary as a key determinant of both judicial and political
branch behavior.
This central focus on the society-wide aspects of dialogue does
not mean that the branches cannot make institutionally distinct
contributions to the broader dialogue that takes place. In fact, in
addition to the judiciary's role in channeling and fostering societal
debate about fundamental values, both the judiciary and the
legislature can make important contributions to society-wide
discussions based on their distinct perspectives and unique
institutional capacities.2 Judges, for example, have distinct
institutional advantages in highlighting the individualized effects of
legislation that may have gone unnoticed by the legislature.22' 5 They
also have comparative temporal advantages in ensuring that sufficient
attention is paid to constitutional values in the legislative process.226
The legislative branch, in contrast, has distinct institutional
advantages in dealing with polycentric issues and in considering how
to balance the pursuit of policy objectives with the recognition and
protection of fundamental rights.227
Drawing attention to the institutionally distinct contributions
that judges and legislators can bring to society-wide dialogue does not
entail prescribing that these actors should make particular
contributions, or that the participants in dialogue should learn from
223. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Forms of Judicial Review as Expressions of Constitutional
Patriotism, 22 LAW & PHIL. 353 (2003) (distinguishing between strong-form and
weak-form systems, in part, on whether dialogue takes place over the short or long
term).
224. See generally Bateup, The Dialogic Promise, supra note 27, at 1174-79.
225. See, e.g., Jeremy Webber, A Modest (but Robust) Defence of Statutory Bills of
Rights, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 136, at 263,
276 ("That is a key characteristic of judicial decision-making: the attempt to ensure
that the application of general norms is attentive to the details of particular
circumstances.").
226. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, An "Indispensable Feature"?
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 27 (2002)
(arguing that due to the multiple roles legislatures have to fulfill, they "may not
always give sufficient attention to particular concerns such as civil liberties. In
passing specific laws, therefore, it may make sense for courts to insist on some further
demonstration from legislatures that they have performed their legislative role
properly.").
227. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353 (1978) (discussing the nature of polycentric inquiries).
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each others' input. Rather, the value in this exercise lies in
identifying what the judiciary and the legislature do in fact bring to
discussions about fundamental rights in specific cases, by virtue of
their institutional status. Dialogic learning might result from these
contributions, but this will simply be a functional by-product of the
process of dialogue rather than the result of any normative choice
that the participants make to engage in "dialogue" with one another.
Furthermore, drawing attention to these institutional contributions
should not detract from the fact that the contributions of the branches
form merely one part of broader societal dialogue about fundamental
meaning.
Based as it is on positive evidence regarding the operation of
judicial review, the society-wide account of dialogue accordingly has
considerable explanatory power. 228 The positive, society-wide account
of dialogue also has substantial normative merit in its own right
stemming from the society-wide nature of the dialogue that takes
place . 29 Society-wide dialogue can be seen as a democratic strength
because it ensures that national discussion and debate take place
about issues of fundamental importance to society. This ensures that
understandings about fundamental rights are continually developed
and gradually modified over the longer term in response to new social
conditions.230 As part of this process, the judicial facilitation and
moderation of the contributions of the different dialogic participants,
including the people, can assist in the search for more widely accepted
and enduring answers to questions regarding fundamental values.
The ultimate effect is thus to preserve popular input into debates
about fundamental values, thereby ensuring that the people remain
involved in working out their society's core commitments over time.23
228. On whether it provides a complete explanation of how judicial review
operates, see Bateup, The Dialogic Promise, supra note 27, at 1166-68.
229. See id. at 1165-66.
230. See GINSBURG, supra note 194, at 72 ("The ongoing process of interpretation
means that the Constitution is continually being developed and subtly adjusted to
new social conditions.").
231. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's
Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 47, 53 (1995) ("Constitutionalism is, among other
things, a way for the political community to 'talk out' its political identity.");
Friedman, Politics, supra note 81, at 334 ("Judicial review is simply a practice that
permits and yet focuses popular discussion over the meaning of the Constitution,
assisting us as a polity to reach decisions consistent with our deepest values.").
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B. Society-Wide Dialogue and Weak-Form Models of
Judicial Review
Although the society-wide understanding of dialogue was
developed to describe the nature of judicial review in the United
States, the fact that it is grounded in positive insights about judicial
and legislative behavior suggests that it can be readily extended to
other national contexts where judges exercise the power of rights-
based judicial review, whether constitutional or statutory in form.232
Given that all national judiciaries operate in an institutional
environment that places limits on their sphere of action, we can
predict that a similar process of dialogue about fundamental rights
between the judiciary, the political branches and the people will be
generated in a range of constitutional settings. 3 Dialogue can
therefore be conceived as a more general and wide-ranging feature of
the strategic relationship between the judiciary and other political
and social actors, rather than a limited form of institutional
interaction that is created by the adoption of particular weak-form
bill of rights mechanisms."'
The extension of the positive account of dialogue to other
settings also has considerable normative appeal given the way in
which this account resolves the democratic legitimacy concerns
associated with judicial review, though it does so in quite a distinct
fashion to weak-form dialogue theory.3 Weak-form dialogue theory
attempts to reconcile judicial authority with democratic theory by
proposing specific roles for the branches to perform when they
interact with one another. According to this heavily prescriptive
vision, democratic concerns with judicial review are only overcome if
judges and legislators actually perform in a normatively appropriate
fashion. The positive account of dialogue, in contrast, bridges the
232. While the positive account of dialogue developed in the United States is not
restricted to constitutional judging in the context of rights, dialogue most commonly
occurs in rights-based cases because these cases are generally the most controversial
and highly salient with the public.
233. See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra note 194, at 72 (suggesting that judges can play a
role in constitutional dialogue in both established and emerging democracies as a
result of strategic institutional dynamics).
234. For a discussion of how this form of dialogue appears to be operating in
Canada, see Bateup, Expanding the Conversation, supra note 158.
235. See generally Bateup, The Dialogic Promise, supra note 27 (discussing how




divide between judicial review and democracy by demonstrating that
institutional constraints in fact operate to keep judicial decisions
within democratic limits. Given that the political branches and the
people can, and do, respond to judicial rulings in a dialogic fashion,
the force of the democratic objection to judicial review is thereby
overcome as a positive fact.
While there are strong positive and normative reasons to extend
this alternative understanding of dialogue to other nations, some
further consideration must be given to how the precise dynamics of
dialogue will vary in different constitutional settings. Even though we
can expect that society-wide dialogue will be a common feature of
rights-based judicial review, this does not mean that dialogue will
evolve in precisely the same way, or take place to the same extent, in
all national contexts. Of principal importance, judges in different
constitutional systems will have varying abilities to speak out with a
strong voice and foster dialogue about fundamental rights based on
the extent to which they are effectively constrained.
As we have seen, while judges in all constitutional systems are
constrained due to the complex institutional environment in which
they operate, the overall force of these constraints varies as a
practical matter depending on the structural impediments that exist to
effective political action and the strength of incentives motivating
political branch respect for judicial rulings in specific constitutional
systems. Where there are few or only weak constraints on judicial
behavior, we would expect to find judges speaking out more
frequently on the basis of their own understandings about rights by
taking such action as invalidating legislation. The ability of judges to
act in this fashion is likely to lead to a more vibrant process of society-
wide dialogue than in systems where judges are more effectively
constrained.36 This is because the possibility of divergence between
judicial and popular views and the ensuing "clash of argument" are
the principal factors that create the dynamic tension to move dialogue
forward. 7 Controversial judicial decisions inevitably stir up dust and
236. Cf. Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, supra note 30, at
248-49 (suggesting that the legislature and the public will be more likely to "attach
weight to judicial deliberations and seriously discuss the relevant constitutional
matters" if judges have the power to strike down legislation).
237. Nicol, supra note 61, at 745 ("[Ilt is through the clash of argument ... that the
'best' arguments about human rights can in the long form prevail."); see also
Friedman, supra note 210, at 679 ("The divergence between popular sentiment and
the judiciary is what makes the dialogue work... Judicial action creates the dynamic
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give critics a reason to come together in opposition to judicial views.'
This disagreement then serves as a "creative force" that invigorates a
robust debate and ensures that the national conversation continues in
a dynamic fashion long after the judiciary has spoken. 9
Although the divergence of judicial and popular views and the
expression of disagreement are the primary forces that help to drive
vibrant society-wide dialogue, this does not mean that dialogue
cannot occur in less confrontational circumstances. Animated
discussions about controversial issues can also take place when judges
are deferential to political preferences, or where there is no judicial
involvement in the debate at all.2 O Nevertheless, when significant
disagreement exists about a particular issue, strong judicial
contributions can help to ensure that rights issues remain in the
headlines for a longer period of time, thus exposing them to broader
and more robust debate.24' In so doing, there is also greater potential
for the people to remain involved in working out their society's core
understandings about rights over the long term.42
These general insights enable us to make a number of more
specific predictions about how the different models of judicial review
will impact the operation and evolution of society-wide dialogue
about rights. As we have seen, the institutional and strategic
dynamics of strong-form judicial review and the legislative override
model are similar because both systems empower judges to invalidate
legislation; they simply have different mechanisms available to the
tension that moves the system of constitutional interpretation along.").
238. See Friedman, Positive, supra note 210, at 1291 (noting that dialogue happens
in part because of "judicial ruling[s] that seem to some at least to interfere with
judgments made by the democratic political process").
239. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1562 (1992).
240. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and
Legislators, 23 S. CT. L. REV. (2d) 7, 28-29 (2004); Kahana, Understanding the
Notwithstanding Mechanism, supra note 30, at 281 ("Nothing prevents the public
from engaging in rigorous public debate, even in areas where the court has said
nothing.").
241. See, e.g., Nicol, Law and Politics, supra note 61, at 747 (strong judicial action
"tend[s] to grab the headlines, thereby exposing rights issues to wider debate and
forcing them on the political agenda."); Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding
Mechanism, supra note 30, at 278 (judicial decisions that might prompt use of an
override "put the issue on the national agenda for a longer period of time ...
[creating] an opportunity for a longer and gradual public discussion.").
242. The abortion controversy in the United States is a good example of this. See,
e.g. DEVINS, supra note 210; Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 210, at 658-68.
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political branches to respond to judicial rulings in the event of
disagreement. It is unlikely that these mechanisms will be used in the
vast majority of cases, however, because some combination of
structural and strategic impediments to effective political action is
likely to exist in most constitutional settings. 43 We can accordingly
expect that because national judiciaries in both strong-form and
legislative override systems will generally retain significant discretion
in relation to the actions they take, they will often be able to speak
with a stronger voice and play an important role in fostering and
facilitating society-wide dialogue about fundamental rights and
values.2'
In stark contrast to the dialogic dynamics of strong-form and
legislative override systems, we would not expect to find judges in
most declaration of incompatibility systems playing such a robust role
in society-wide dialogue. As we have seen, the unique structure of
that system means that political incentives to implement judicial
rulings must be incredibly weighty to overcome the effects of
legislative inertia, even if few structural barriers exist to effective
political action. Because such incentives are unlikely to exist in most
national settings, judges can be expected to be more effectively
constrained than under alternative models of judicial review. In turn,
this will lead judges to be more deferential to political preferences
and to avoid issuing declarations of incompatibility whenever
possible.215 To the extent that these dynamics operate in a particular
system, we are therefore likely to find a more impoverished form of
dialogue about fundamental rights.246
To a certain extent, the broad interpretive powers that judges are
routinely granted under the declaration of incompatibility model may
counteract these dynamics. Given that strong interpretive provisions
provide judges in declaration of incompatibility systems with an
243. See Gibson et al., supra note 113 (showing that high levels of public support
for the judiciary exist across a range of nations).
244. See, e.g., Whittington, Legislative Sanctions, supra note 94, at 473 ("The U.S.
Supreme Court can generally act 'sincerely' on its constitutional understandings
because the strategic environment for such actions has been generally favorable.").
245. As the United Kingdom example demonstrates, however, exceptions can
exist if the incentives motivating political branch implementation of judicial
declarations are sufficiently strong.
246. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, we can expect that dialogue will evolve in
a similar fashion to strong-form and legislative override systems of judicial review
because of the different strategic dynamics present in that country.
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alternative way to pursue their own preferences, interpretive rulings
in controversial areas might also result in significant public opposition
and argument, thereby creating the necessary dynamic tension to
keep societal debate moving forward.247 It is nevertheless likely that
interpretive action will only infrequently lead to vibrant dialogue
about rights because statutory rulings are often rather obscure and
inaccessible to the general public.248 As a result, while interpretive
rulings might assist judges in prompting dialogue in isolated cases,
this action also runs the risk of masking the real issues and failing to
engage the public consciousness sufficiently for a robust and
interactive societal discussion to take place.
In conclusion, although declaration of incompatibility systems
are likely to foster some society-wide dialogue about fundamental
rights, the chances of regular and vibrant dialogue evolving appear
greater in both strong-form and legislative override systems due to
the increased power judges have in those systems to directly pursue
their own understandings about rights.249 If one of our goals when
designing a system of rights-based judicial review is to achieve
productive forms of dialogue about rights, strong-form and legislative
override systems of judicial review are therefore likely to be superior
to the declaration of incompatibility model in the majority of national
contexts. Ultimately, however, and contrary to what proponents of
weak-form judicial review might lead us to believe, "the pertinent
choice... lie[s] not between dialogue and no dialogue, but
between... dialogue in which judges have more or less voice."'2 50
247. See, e.g., R v. A, [2001] UKHL 25, 2002 1 A.C. 45 (in which the House of
Lords relied on its section 3 powers under the Human Rights Act to read a provision
that generally prohibited the admissibility of sexual history evidence of the
complainant in rape trials to contain an "implied provision" that evidence which is
required for a fair trial could be admitted by the judge). This decision was the subject
of significant controversy and debate in the United Kingdom. See Aileen Kavanagh,
Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The "Radical" Approach to Section 3(1) Revisited,
2005 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259.
248. See, e.g., Poole, supra note 72, at 203 (suggesting that a choice to use
interpretive powers "favour[s] the quicker but relatively obscure process of statutory
interpretation over the slower but more open and interactive process of judicial
challenge and legislative amendment.").
249. Cf Leighton McDonald, New Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights
Debate, 2004 PUB. L. 22, 29 (U.K.) (suggesting that the stronger-form of judicial
review under the Canadian Charter might generate "more or 'better' dialogue" than
the declaration of incompatibility model in the United Kingdom).




Since Canada pioneered the weak-form model of judicial review
with the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
in 1982, weak-form bills of rights have been praised around the world
for creating a new balance between parliamentary and judicial
supremacy based on inter-branch dialogue between the judiciary and
the legislature. In order for the dialogic potential of these
instruments to be realized, however, weak-form theorists counsel
judges and legislators to adopt a particular normative posture towards
each other's rights-based contributions. Although weak-form
dialogue theory remains highly popular in nations that have adopted
these new rights instruments, this Article has drawn on positive
insights to demonstrate that the normative behavioral assumptions
underlying this theory are, in fact, fundamentally flawed.
In the process of critiquing weak-form dialogue theory, this
Article has also explored what kinds of behavior can be expected of
the branches as they perform their roles under weak-form
instruments. Rather than pursuing some normative desire to engage
in inter-branch "dialogue" with one another, it has been argued the
branches are likely to behave strategically in their mutual
interactions. This does not mean, however, that the form a bill of
rights takes is irrelevant to behavioral outcomes. Instead, it has been
suggested that the structure of a bill of rights can have a considerable
impact on behavior because the mechanism chosen to distribute
power between judges and legislatures can alter the strategic balance
between the branches and, therefore, their expected strategic moves.
Although this Article has rejected the explanatory value of
weak-form dialogue theory, it has nonetheless claimed that
"dialogue" remains a highly useful concept provided we understand it
in a rather different way to weak-form theorists. On this alternative
understanding, which is also grounded in positive theory, all systems
of judicial review generate society-wide dialogue between the
judiciary, the political branches and the people about the meaning
and interpretation of rights. Certain judicial review forms promote
more productive dialogic interactions than others, however, because
they enable judges to have a more robust voice and foster more
vibrant societal discussion about rights. Judged on this feature, both
strong-form and legislative override models of judicial review can
generally be preferred to the declaration of incompatibility model
because they provide greater space for a vigorous judicial role.
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In terms of constitutional design, if a nation wants to adopt a
dialogic system of judicial review, we should accordingly favor the
distribution of power between judges and legislators that is found in
strong-form or legislative override systems over that found under the
declaration of incompatibility model. This conclusion does require
some qualification, however. First, this Article does not claim that
strong-form and legislative override systems are the only forms of
judicial review that will result in robust society-wide dialogue; it has
not considered, for example, the impact that alternative systems, such
as the Kelsenian model commonly found in Europe, might have on
the operation of societal dialogue about rights."' In addition,
although strong-form and legislative override systems can generally
be expected to result in more productive forms of dialogue than the
declaration of incompatibility model, definitive conclusions can only
be drawn on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, it would be prudent to
first consider what system-specific incentives exist in a particular
national setting before predicting how the various models of judicial
review might operate there, as the British example makes especially
clear. Predictions about the possibilities for society-wide dialogue in
a particular nation should only be made, therefore, after these
preliminary matters have been considered.
Perhaps most importantly, we should also remember that
achieving dialogue may not be the only goal of constitutional
designers.252 In this regard, while both strong-form and legislative
override systems are likely to foster vibrant society-wide dialogue in
most national settings, there may be other non-dialogic reasons to
favor one model of judicial review over another. For example, rule of
law concerns may lead us to favor the incorporation of a legislative
override rather than leaving the political branches to resort to blunter
sanctioning tools in the event of disagreement with judicial rulings.253
251. See, e.g., Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Dialogues Between Courts
and Legislatures: Some Potential Advantages of the Kelsenian Model of Judicial
Review (June 31, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Alec Stone
Sweet, Constitutional Dialogues: Protecting Rights in France, Germany, Italy & Spain,
in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 8, 8 (Sally J. Kenney
et al. eds., 1999).
252. See Comella, supra note 251, at 2 ("Other goals may be paramount and may
require us to introduce rules that make the system of judicial review 'second-best' in
terms of dialogue.").
253. See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355-65 (distinguishing between
"legitimate" and "illegitimate" interference with the judiciary).
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Alternatively, given that strong-form judicial review is commonly,
though incorrectly, regarded as synonymous with judicial supremacy,
there may be greater public and political acceptance of a bill of rights
containing a legislative override or some other weak-form
mechanism. To the extent that actually achieving dialogue remains a
priority, however, we must discard understandings of weak-form and
strong-form models of judicial review that are based on unfounded
normative assumptions in favor of alternatives that better reflect how
judicial review actually operates in the real world.
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